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Executive Summary 
 
The research presented here is premised on the assumption that in order to evaluate the 
risks and benefits, the desirability and ethics of a technology, we must know how it is 
likely to interact with its context. The research aims to identify the contexts relevant to 
the implementation of biopharming in New Zealand and to investigate whether and how 
the associated risks can be managed. It does this by eliciting relevant knowledge from 
people with experience and expertise in the identified contexts. 
 
Animal biopharming is defined here as the farming of transgenic animals genetically 
modified to produce pharmaceutical compounds for use in humans.  Plant biopharming is 
also under development.  Biopharming is one of several methods that can be used to 
produce the class of drugs known as biopharmaceuticals.  Animal biopharming research 
and development have focused primarily on dairy species. 
 
The major drivers internationally for the development of animal biopharming are its 
potential to lower the costs of drug production, the greater ease of upscaling and 
downscaling production, an anticipated shortage of manufacturing capacity using other 
production methods, the potential to address some of the limitations of other production 
methods, and the desire to strengthen or evade patent restrictions.  In New Zealand, major 
drivers include New Zealand’s animal-health status, the strength of its dairy research and 
farm management, and a desire to use biopharming as a tool to move the economy away 
from commodity production and to enhance economic competitiveness.  Biopharming 
research and development in New Zealand is currently focused on dairy cows. 
 
Significant uncertainties remain regarding the potential benefits and hazards of 
biopharming.  These include: cost-effectiveness in relation to competing platforms, 
unresolved technical problems, patent and regulatory issues, potential risks to human 
health, issues of gene spread, and animal-welfare concerns.  
 
Factors to be considered when assessing the prospects, including the risks and benefits, of 
biopharming in New Zealand should include the nature of the biopharming enterprise 
(e.g., animals used, activities encompassed, and operational and ownership structure) as 
well as the risk management measures likely to be applied.  Four scenarios have been 
developed for assessment based on these factors.   
 
Factors relevant to risk assessment and management of biopharming emerging from the 
research encompass implications of the farm context for risk management as well as 
impacts of risk management on farm practice.  The former include: impact of ownership 
structure, social and economic influences on implementation of controls, labour market, 
and the role of human error.  The latter include: grazing practices, disposal of carcasses 
and waste, farm location, movements on and off the farm, and future land use. 
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Application of the research findings to the scenarios suggests that there are substantial 
obstacles in the way of animal biopharming being taken up by dairy farmers in New 
Zealand.  Specialist integrated biopharm operations may not face the same obstacles, but 
may also not offer the prospective benefits that have driven research on biopharming in 
New Zealand. Application of the findings to risk assessment and risk management points 
to a need to include a wider range of knowledge in risk-assessment processes and to 
consider a wider range of factors in assessing risks and benefits and in developing risk-
management protocols. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This report represents the findings of part of a research project1 that asks: What do we 
need to know in order to make competent decisions about biopharming in New Zealand? 
The overall goal of the research on biopharming is to identify regulatory and governance 
needs and implications associated with biopharming and related technologies.  
 
Animal biopharming 
 
Animal biopharming is defined here as the farming of transgenic animals genetically 
modified to produce “humanised” pharmaceutical substances for use in humans.  
Biopharming is also known as “molecular farming”. Examples of types of animal 
biopharming currently being researched include cows, sheep and goats modified to 
produce the substance in their milk and chickens modified to produce the substances in 
their eggs.  Biopharming using plants is also under development.   
 
No biopharmed products have yet reached the stage of commercial production. Many are 
in various stages of the research, development and approval process (see Table 1).  In  
2006, GTC Biotherapeutics/Genzyme Europe became the first company to be given 
permission to market a drug made in the body of a transgenic animal when it received 
marketing authorisation from the European Medicines Agency (EMEA) for Atryn®, a 
recombinant form of human antithrombin produced in transgenic goats (see Box 1). 
 
 
Box 1.  ATryn® 
 
Atryn®, a recombinant form of human antithrombin produced in transgenic goats, became the first  
transgenic protein drug produced in an animal “bioreactor” to be approved for use as a human medicine 
in 2006 when it was approved by the EMEA for use in patients with congenital antithrombin deficiency  
undergoing surgery, to prevent deep-vein thrombosis and thromboembolism .  EMEA’s Committee for 
Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) initially issued a negative opinion on Atryn® because of 
too few relevant clinical cases and insufficient studies looking for the development of antibodies. 
However, at the company’s request, CHMP re-examined its opinion, agreed to include clinical cases 
eliminated earlier due to dosing inconsistencies, eventually recommending marketing authorisation.  It 
suggested addressing the antibodies issue through close post-market monitoring by the company.  
Though some interpreted this decision as putting paid to fears that regulators would resist biopharm 
drugs, others saw EMEA approving an “infrequent use” drug in order to encourage development of 
processes to prepare recombinant pharmaceutical proteins, because “[t]hey want good proteins and they 
hope the method will work.” (L. M. Houdebine quoted in Schmidt, 2006). ATryn® does not yet have 
USFDA approval but is in phase 3 trials for the same clinical use.  ATryn® has also entered phase 2 
trials in Europe for its use with disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC) occurring in association 
with severe sepsis.  (See www.gtc-bio.com and the EMeA document, ‘Questions and answers on Atryn’ 
at www.emea.eu.int). 
 
                                                 
1 This research constitutes one part of the Constructive Conversations/Kōrero Whakaaetanga project; 
Foundation for Research, Science and Technology contract UOCX0221. 
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Table 1: Therapeutic proteins produced in transgenic animals currently in 
commercial development  
Production Animal Companies Products Developmental Stage 
Cows Bio Sidus Human growth hormone Preclinical 
 GTC Biotherapeutics Albumin Preclinical 
 Pharming Collagen Preclinical 
 Pharming Fibrinogen Preclinical 
 Pharming Lactoferrin Preclinical 
Chickens Avian Initiative Recombinant proteins  
 AviGenics Recombinant proteins Clinical 
 Origen Therapeutics Human poly and 
monoclonal antibodies  
Preclinical 
 Viragen Interferon alpha and single 
chain antibody 
Preclinical 
 Vivalis Recombinant proteins Preclinical 
Fish Ecoarray Recombinant human factor 
VII 
 
Goats Genzyme Transgenics 
and Genzyme 
Antithrombin III Phase 3 
 GTC Biotherapeutics  Alpha-1 Antitrypsin Phase 2 in EU 
 GTC Biotherapeutics ATryn Approved in EU June 2, 
2006 
US: Phase 3 
 GTC Biotherapeutics CD137 (4-1BB) MAb 
(Antibody) 
Preclinical 
 GTC Biotherapeutics Malaria Vaccine Preclinical 
 Merrimack and GTC 
Biotherapeutics 
MM-093 Phase 2 RA 
 Nexia Biotechnologies Protexia (human 
butyrylcholinesterase) 
Spider Silk protein 
Preclinical 
 Pharmathene Butyrylcholinesterase Research 
Pigs Foulum Research 
Center 
Alzheimer’s model Research 
 North Carolina State 
University 
Retinal pigmentosa Model Research 
 Progenetics Factor –lX Research 
 Revivicor Xenotransplantation 
(cartilage implants) 
Polyclonal antibodies 
Research 
 University of Missouri Xenotransplantation Research 
Rabbits BioProtein 
Technologies 
Recombinant proteins Research 
 Pharming Alpha-Glusidase Phase 2, on hold 
 Pharming C1 Esterase Inhibitor Phase 3 for HAE 
 Pharming Fibrinogen Preclinical 
 Pharming Lactoferrin Preclinical 
 Therapeutic Human 
Proteins 
Humanized polyclonal 
antibodies 
Research 
Sources: Kaye-Blake, Saunders, and Ferguson, 2007: 54-56; Keefer, Pommer and Robl, 2007; Echelard, 
Ziomek and Meade 2006: 38, Schmidt, 2006. 
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The pharmaceutical compounds produced through biopharming are a subset of the class 
of pharmaceuticals known as biopharmaceuticals.  Biopharmaceuticals are medical drugs 
produced through biotechnology (rather than through chemical synthesis), by means other 
than direct extraction from a native (non-engineered) biological source (Walsh, 1998).  
They are typically manufactured through fermentation processes involving bacteria, 
yeasts, fungi or algae, or through cell cultures from insect, plant or animal cell systems 
(Elbehri, 2005; Dyck, 2003). Biopharming is thus one method, or “production platform”, 
for the production of biopharmaceuticals.   
 
Animal biopharming in New Zealand 
 
New Zealand's strong agricultural experience and expertise, its freedom from animal 
diseases such as BSE, and the desire to move out of commodity markets have led to the 
identification of animal biopharming as a significant opportunity for New Zealand 
(MoRST, 2005: 67). According to MoRST’s 2005 “futurewatch” report,  
 
[t]he production of high-value proteins (like pharmaceuticals), using plants or 
animals as bioreactors or “factories”, is forecast to occur between 2007 and 2020. 
Biopharming using farm animals is forecast to occur before production in plants. 
(MoRST, 2005:11) 
 
Animal biopharming research is occurring in New Zealand.  Between 1999 and 2003, in 
Whakamaru, PPL Therapeutics developed a flock of transgenic sheep modified to 
produce recombinant human alpha-1-antitrypsin (hAAT).  Since 1999, AgResearch has 
been producing transgenic cows modified to produce various human pharmaceutical 
proteins at their Hamilton-based research site, Ruakura.  (See Chapter 2.) 
 
Knowledge for assessing animal biopharming: structure of this report 
 
The research presented here is premised on the assumption that in order to evaluate the 
risks and benefits, the desirability and ethics of a technology, we must know how it is 
likely to interact with its context. The research aims to identify the contexts relevant to 
the implementation of biopharming in New Zealand and to investigate whether and how 
the associated risks can be managed. It does this by eliciting relevant knowledge from 
people with experience and expertise in the identified contexts.   
 
In order to carry out such a prospective assessment of a future development, it is 
necessary to understand the likely developmental trajectory of the technology.  What 
shape is it likely to take in New Zealand if and when it goes beyond the field-testing stage 
to commercial production?  This requires some understanding not only of what is 
technically possible, but also of the economic and social drivers behind the development 
of the technology.  Chapter 2 presents a discussion of these drivers and the associated 
claims that are made about the future of biopharming.  
 
Because much of biopharming’s economic and medical promise is yet to be 
demonstrated, in Chapter 3 we present findings from the international literature 
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concerning the uncertainties and unknowns surrounding the potential benefits and harms 
of animal biopharming.  As the Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA) 
must take into account both risks and benefits, an understanding of the uncertainties 
surrounding both is important for robust decision-making.  It may also be of value to 
research funders, as decisions regarding the funding of research projects also take into 
account the future benefits claimed for the proposed research,. 
 
In Chapter 4 we present possible scenarios for the commercialisation of animal 
biopharming in New Zealand, including the types of animals most likely to be used and 
the ownership and management conditions under which commercialisation is most likely 
to occur. These have been derived both from the literature and from data obtained from 
interviews with a range of key actors in New Zealand. These key actors came from the 
Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (MoRST), Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry (MAF), New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE), Biosecurity NZ, ERMA, 
AgResearch, Meat and Wool New Zealand, Fonterra2 and an additional dairy 
cooperative, Vialactia, and LactoPharma. 
 
 In order to identify both the practices in the sector that may be impacted upon by the 
demands of biopharming and the sector practices that may represent risks in the context 
of biopharming, we carried out interviews with those directly involved in dairying (both 
caprine and bovine): a variety of dairy farmers supplying Fonterra, dairy-farmer 
representatives of Federated Farmers, and members of the NZ Dairy Goat Co-Operative 
and the Dairy Goat Breeders Association.  We present the findings from these interviews 
in Chapter 5. 
 
In Chapter 6 we conclude by discussing the implication of our findings for the prospects 
of biopharming in New Zealand, for its practical management and for its regulation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd is a multinational dairy company, owned by 11,600 New Zealand dairy 
farmers. Fonterra shareholders make up over 95% of New Zealand dairy farmers (Fonterra 2006). 
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Chapter 2: Drivers and Prospects 
 
This chapter presents the various claims, prospects and forces influencing the 
development of animal biopharming.  The first part of this discussion highlights findings 
from the international science and technology literature, as well as “grey literature” (such 
as working papers, policy advice and commissioned research reports), on biopharming 
and related technologies.  This is followed by a discussion of New Zealand-specific 
issues, based upon New Zealand literature and interviews with key actors.  We end the 
chapter with a  discussion of New Zealand-based biopharming research and development. 
 
2.1.  Generic drivers 
 
2.1.1. Lowering production costs of biopharmaceuticals  
The discussion of the merits of animal biopharming in the international literature is 
dominated by statements that it is expected to lower the costs of production of 
pharmaceuticals.  It is claimed that biopharming will be a simpler, more efficient 
system with lower set-up costs that produces higher volumes of more stable proteins 
than traditional production methods.  Current production  methods (fermentation and 
cell cultures) are characterised as inefficient, expensive and time-consuming processes, 
while biopharming promises significantly lower infrastructure and operating costs 
(Echelard, Ziomek & Meade, 2006; Keefer, 2004; Kues and Niemann, 2004: 287; 
Rudolph, 1999; Laible & Wells, 2007: 112).   
 
Dyck et al. (2003: 394-5) argue that transgenic technology offers the lowest-cost 
method for producing biopharmaceuticals: “[b]uilding a large-scale (10 000 l[itre] 
bioreactor) manufacturing facility for mammalian cells takes 3–5 years and costs 
US$250–500 million, whereas a transgenic farm with a single purification facility 
should not cost more than US$80 million, probably less.”  They posit that the cost of 
purification once the protein has been produced will be similar whatever the production 
system.  They acknowledge, however, that it is difficult to carry out a direct 
comparison because there are so many unknowns such as “lack of data on protein 
yield, purification rates and production scale … [and] specific recombinant protein 
being produced”.   
 
2.1.2. Capacity shortage and flexible supply  
Demand for recombinant pharmaceutical proteins is expected to grow, and manufacturing 
capacity is said to be a major constraint on future supply (Dyck et al., 2003: 394; Elbehri, 
2005).  The use of transgenic animals to produce biopharmaceuticals is presented as a 
way of addressing this predicted shortfall in manufacturing capacity (Houdebine, 2005; 
Dyck et al., 2003; ERMA, 2002: 44).   
 11
Constructive Conversations/Kōrero Whakaaetanga Rpt 12 
 
 
[I]ndustry analysts expect an average of six or seven new large-molecule drugs to 
reach the market each year over the next several years. These monoclonal 
antibodies, which require a large production capacity, are expected to make up 
about a third of all new therapeutics … [C]urrent cell culture facilities are unlikely 
to meet the expected demand. (Ginsberg, Bhatia, & McMinn, 2002)   
 
According to Elbehri (2005: 19, citing Fernandez, Crawford, & Hefferan [2002]),  
 
each newly approved monoclonal antibody requires 100,000 kg of production 
annually requiring new fermentation capacity to be built. To meet the expected 
demand for new drug production, more than three times the current production 
capacity may be required. It is estimated that 20–50% of potential therapeutics 
industry wide could be delayed due to the lack of manufacturing capacity. 
 
This focus on capacity was sparked by the case of Enbrel, a drug produced by Immunex 
that treats rheumatoid arthritis.  Enbrel is produced in 10,000 litre bioreactors of cultured 
Chinese hamster cells.  It was approved by FDA in 1998 and experienced a supply 
shortage by 2001 (Thiel, 2004; Elbehri, 2005).  By 2002 there was a waiting list of 
13,000 patients, and Immunex began rationing it.3   
 
An important dimension of biopharming’s predicted cost-effectiveness is the ability to 
scale production up or down quickly (in response to demand) simply by increasing or 
decreasing the number of animals required and/or their lactation.  This is contrasted to 
the need, when using current fermentation or cell-culture methods, to build expensive 
new facilities in order to increase production (Laible & Wells, 2007: 112; Keefer et al., 
2007: 4, 6; Dove, 2000; Rudolph 1999; Bialy, 1991).  
 
2.1.3. Opportunities for patent-enhancing and patent-busting  
Rather than producing new medicines, biopharming may be seen instead as a way to 
reinforce or undermine patents on existing medicines.  A number of biopharmaceuticals 
are due to come off-patent in the near future. Biopharming may enable a company to 
acquire a new patent for the same drug on the basis of its different production method.  
Conversely, “the expiration of the patents for many first generation biopharmaceuticals, 
predominantly produced in cultured mammalian cells, provides additional opportunities 
for the production of ‘biosimilars’, essentially equivalent recombinant proteins of 
previously approved pharmaceuticals[,] from transgenic animals” (Laible & Wells, 2007: 
113).  Biopharming may also enable companies to “bust” existing patents by developing 
a new process to produce a substance whose patent is associated with another method of 
production.  These prospects are heavily dependent on regulatory and patent-agency 
decisions. 
                                                 
3 Others question whether this case points to a more general shortage of capacity, for example, Thiel 
(2004).  See Chapter 3. 
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2.1.4. Potential for new and better drugs  
Some argue that another driver for animal biopharming is its potential to produce 
biopharmaceuticals that cannot be produced in other ways (Keefer et al., 2007; Thiel, 
2004; Dove, 2000).  Dyck et al. (2003: 395) note problems with other production 
platforms (bacteria, yeast, and insect, metazoan and mammalian cells) and suggest that 
transgenic animals (and plants) may avoid these problems, thus presumably enabling 
successful production of drugs that could not (or would not) otherwise be produced.  
 
It is also argued by some that animals have quality advantages over plants or micro-
organisms as a production platform for biopharmaceuticals.  “[T]ransgenic animals are 
well equipped to perform all of the complex post-translational modifications necessary to 
render some proteins biologically active” (Dyck et al., 2003: 395).  Because of their 
greater similarity to humans, animals generate post-translational modifications that, it is 
argued, are likely to result in more “human” proteins than those produced through 
transgenic plants or micro-organisms (Laible & Wells, 2007: 112; FRST, 2005, Bialy, 
1991; ERMA, 2002: 44).4  This could reduce the allergenicity or immunogenicity of the 
drug, or enhance its effectiveness.  On the other hand, the fact that biopharm animals are 
non-human is said to reduce the risk of contamination from and hence, transmission of, 
human pathogens such as human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome (HIV/AIDS) or Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) compared to human cell lines 
(Laible & Wells, 2007;  Keefer et al., 2007). 
 
2.1.5. Economic advantages of dairy species  
The general consensus is that milk-producing mammals are the best candidates for 
biopharming. Other bodily fluids and tissues can also be used for biopharming (MoRST, 
2005, p.69); however, compared to other candidate fluids and tissues, milk is produced in 
large volumes, relatively high concentrations of recombinant proteins can be produced in 
milk, and milk is easily collected (Laible & Wells, 2007; Houdebine, 1995; Bialy, 1991).  
Milk is regarded as a less complex fluid than blood, and so production of the expressed 
proteins is simpler and less expensive. Milk products are also regarded as being less 
likely to produce adverse reactions in humans (Thomson and McWhir, 2004: 234) and to 
be safer than those produced from human fluids (Keefer, 2004: 9).  For that reason, “a 
great deal of effort has been made to produce transgenic bioreactors with the traditional 
‘dairy’ species, such as sheep, goats and cows” (Dyck et al., 2003: 395). 
 
According to Baguisi et al. (1999) and Dove (2000: 1048), goats are well-suited for 
biopharming as they have a quicker breeding cycle than cattle and produce more milk 
than sheep.  Female goats (does) mature to a reproductive age more quickly, have a 
shorter gestation period (six months) and are fertile again six months after birth 
(Redherring, 2006).  Overall they have a generation time of 18 months compared with 3 
months for mice and three years for cows (GTC Therapeutics, n.d.(1)).  Hence herds of 
                                                 
4 On post-translational modification, see Box 2, section 3.2.1. 
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biopharm does would naturally lactate sooner than cows and could thus potentially be 
scaled up more quickly.   
 
The major advantage of cows for biopharming is the volume of milk they produce.  A 
cow’s annual production of milk can exceed 10,000 litres (Bialy, 1991: 786-8). 
 
 
2.2.  New Zealand drivers 
 
Many of the arguments already outlined above are also present in discussions of animal 
biopharming in New Zealand, but while the international literature has highlighted the 
prospects for the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, the discussion in New 
Zealand has placed considerable emphasis on returns to farmers, the composition of 
exports, and a related transformation of the New Zealand economy.  David Powell of 
NZTE argued: 
 
The key benefit of bio-pharming is that the financial returns to growers and 
farmers are many times higher than those in conventional farming… Bio-
pharming is also of interest because the high value pharmaceutical products 
produced will escape the current food-based quotas that many of our exports are 
penalised or prohibited under, further expanding marketing possibilities. (Powell 
2001) 
 
According to Beckman and Goldberg (2003) in a report commissioned by Industry New 
Zealand, “the use of transgenic animals to generate large amounts of human-protein-
based drugs is a natural fit for New Zealand”, while Paul Pickering of Virionyx 
Corporation mainted that:  
 
With its disease-free status, a long history of efficient and innovative farm 
management practices, as well as top quality biomedical research, New Zealand 
has huge potential to claim its place as the world's natural home for the 
development and commercialisation of novel animal and plant derived human 
therapeutics. (P. Pickering, quoted in Powell 2001) 
 
 
2.2.1. Wealth generation and economic competitiveness 
As noted above, it is argued animal biopharming will benefit the farming industry in New 
Zealand.  Scientists and business managers we interviewed emphasised that it would 
provide farmers with an option for producing more valuable products.  By producing 
pharmaceuticals in the milk of a dairy herd, biopharming appears to meet the oft-cited 
need for New Zealand’s agricultural sector to shift from the production of commodity 
goods to higher-value-added goods for export.  
 
The development of biopharming is seen to be an important strategy to increase New 
Zealand’s economic competitiveness. New Zealand has traditionally relied on efficient 
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production methods to produce large quantities of commodities that are price-competitive 
on overseas markets. It is argued that as other countries, particularly in Asia and South 
America, become more efficient commodity producers, New Zealand’s primary-
production sector will become considerably less profitable. Applying biotechnology to 
the agricultural sector is seen as one solution to this problem.  FRST notes in relation to 
its funding of AgResearch’s biopharming research that the “long term aim of the research 
is to maintain and enhance the competitive position of New Zealand’s agricultural sector 
in the global market …” (FRST, n.d.).   
 
NZTE argues for a focus on the development of higher-value products from the primary 
production sector and that the highest revenues from biotechnology for the  primary 
production sector will be derived from non-food health applications (NZTE, 2005).  
Biopharming is particularly attractive as it promises to give the sector access to the high 
profit levels of the pharmaceutical industry.  It is recognised that the attractiveness of 
biopharming to investors lies in its potential for reduced costs of production. MoRST has 
claimed that specialist drugs may be produced through animal biopharming at one 
thousandth the current cost of production (MoRST, 2005: 68).   
 
2.2.2. The advantage of disease-free status 
New Zealand’s animal-health status is seen as a major competitive advantage.  New 
Zealand is free from Foot and Mouth Disease and from scrapie and the related prion 
diseases, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs). In fact, Beckman and 
Goldberg (2003: 10) make the claim that “the country can boast the ‘cleanest’ animals on 
the earth”.  This point is prominent throughout the New Zealand literature (e.g., Laible & 
Wells, 2007; MoRST, 2006; L.E.K., 2006). Furthermore, New Zealand is regarded as 
having strict regulatory processes which maintain this ‘clean’ disease-free status.   
 
Kues and Neimann (2004: 288) note that the FDA’s general guidelines require close 
control and monitoring of animal health and performance of the transgenic animal over 
several generations. They suggest that biopharming should be conducted using animals 
from disease-free countries to make this process easier. It is notable that the one 
drug/medicine from a biopharm animal that has been approved for use, GTC 
Biotherapeutic’s ATryn®, is made from milk of a transgenic goat herd that was 
established through the importation of goats from New Zealand certified as scrapie-free 
by the USDA5.   
 
2.2.3. Strong dairy and research sector 
Other attributes of New Zealand’s farming sector also contribute to the belief that New 
Zealand has an advantageous position from which to develop animal biopharming: 
namely, expertise and experience in (dairy) farm management and a strong dairy research 
sector.  Beckman and Goldberg (2003) claim that “dairy farming and animal husbandry 
are marvelously developed businesses in New Zealand”, while MoRST (2005: 67) argues 
that New Zealand expertise in farm management, animal husbandry systems, and 
veterinary care may also encourage foreign companies to invest in animal biopharming 
                                                 
5 From the GTC Biotherapeutics website: www.gtc-bio.com/science/howitworks.html 
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here.  New Zealand has had strong backing both privately and by government for basic 
research on cattle, which may be helpful for the development of animal biopharming 
(Beckman & Goldberg, 2003:10) 
 
 
2.3.  Biopharming research and development in New Zealand  
 
Two biopharming research and development projects have reached the stage of field trials 
in New Zealand.  Between 1999 and 2003, Scotland-based PPL Therapeutics developed a 
flock of transgenic sheep engineered to express recombinant human alpha-1-antitrypsin 
[rhAAT] in their milk.  The declared intention was to use rhAAT to develop treatments 
for lung ailments.  The flock was located at Whakamaru, near Rotorua.  
 
In 2003, PPL announced that it was putting this research “on hold”, because its 
development partner, the pharmaceutical company Bayer, had suspended its development 
of the treatment.6  It is not clear whether Bayer’s suspension resulted from lack of 
effectiveness of the treatment or a change in the economics of that market (Hunt et al., 
2003: 8-9). The companies, in a joint statement, reported that the "resources required to 
move the project forward, combined with the decision not to build a commercial 
purification facility because of the financial risk, have led the companies to the decision 
to place the project on hold" (Associated Press, 2003).   
 
At the time the research was suspended, there were approximately 4000 rhAAT-
producing transgenic sheep in the flock (ERMA 2003).  ERMA responded by increasing 
the frequency of inspections of the facility from three-monthly to weekly.  PPL was 
reported to be “undertaking a managed reduction of their flock, particularly through 
reducing the number of older sheep … in accordance with controls on the approval” 
(ERMA 2003).  The facility was closed in March 2004 and the land sold to Whakamaru 
Farms Limited, which is described (on the Innovation Waikato website) as “a biotech 
company which does large animal work on a contract or joint venture basis.”  In 2004 the 
site was reported as being used for contract grazing of dairy cows (GE Free NZ, 2004). 
 
ERMA’s 1999 approval stipulated that “[i]n the event that operations cease all sheep in 
the containment facilities shall be destroyed and all biological material derived from 
transgenic sheep be incinerated, and Ngati Raukawa shall be invited to undertake a 
Whakanoa or ritual cleansing ceremony.”  ERMA had not made stipulations regarding 
future uses, or monitoring, of the land on which the trial took place, which led to an 
unsuccessful legal challenge being taken against ERMA that sought the imposition of 
ongoing controls. 
 
The second biopharming research and development project is ongoing at AgResearch.  In 
2001, ERMA approved an application from AgResearch (GMF98009) to produce cattle 
genetically modified to express recombinant human myelin basic protein in their milk.  In 
                                                 
6 See “PPL Therapeutics Limited Update” on the ERMA website, http://www.ermanz.govt.nz/news-
events/archives/media-releases/2003/mr-20030717.html 
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2002, ERMA approved a further application (GMD02028) “to develop transgenic cattle 
that can express functional therapeutic foreign proteins in their milk and to develop 
transgenic cattle to study gene function and genetic performance” (ERMA 2002).  The 
proteins were not specified; the application sought a generic approval. While application 
was made under the “development” category, it was intended to encompass a herd of 
transgenic cows held in outdoor containment.   
 
AgResearch has since applied to ERMA for a number of amendments of the 2002 
decision.  The original ERMA decision had excluded use of: all viral sequences other 
than SV40 and the EBV origin of replication;  from the vector insert, all bacterial 
sequences other than reporter gene and marker genes, and their associated promoters, and 
multiple cloning sites derived from non-pathogenic strains of E. coli bacteria; known 
animal (as well as human) viral receptors; antibiotic resistance markers conferring 
resistance to antibiotics of clinical significance in veterinary or human medicine; and 
genes associated with the development of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies 
(prion diseases) (ERMA2002).  In 2005 AgResearch was given approval to use a 
selectable marker gene coding for resistance to puromycin (an antibiotic).  In 2005, they 
were also granted approval to use imported sperm and embryos from transgenic animals 
to develop the herd, while the original approval had been premised on development of 
transgenic embryos in New Zealand though cell culture, transfection, selection of stable 
cell clones and nuclear transfer.  In 2007, AgResearch applied under GMD02028 to be 
permitted to use two genetic sequences of viral origin (ERMA 2007a); at the time of 
writing, there had not yet been a decision on this application. 
 
The aspects of this research funded by FRST under the title ‘Transgenic cattle producing 
valuable proteins’ are described as aiming “to build, through cloned-transgenic cattle, a 
new biotechnology based pharmaceutical/nutraceutical industry in NZ” (FRST 2005a).  
AgResearch reported that it has “entered into an agreement with the Dutch company 
Pharming to establish a small number of cattle for the production of human lactoferrin” 
(FRST 2006c).  According to an industry report, under the agreement AgResearch’s 
responsibilities include: 
 
production of rhLF [recombinant human lactoferrin] and purification, as well as 
providing research capabilities for product development. AgResearch will also 
fund the initial production of rhLF and support the commercialisation of the 
ingredient in the South Pacific and Asia. (Taylor, 2005) 
 
In return for granting AgResearch a research license to its proprietary technology for the 
production of recombinant proteins, Pharming:  
 
will have the first right to review new products arising out of AgResearch's 
protein discovery and R&D projects. The commercial rights of Pharming will 
cover recombinant bovine and human proteins produced using its proprietary 
technology. (Taylor, 2005) 
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AgResearch had also established a commercial relationship with PPL Therapeutics before 
its demise, which it described as securing for AgResearch “the commercial freedom to 
operate for future NZ biotechnology enterprises in this highly lucrative market” (FRST, 
2005a). 
 
In late 2007, AgResearch announced that it would apply to ERMA in April 2008 to 
extend and expand its biopharming research and development.  It will seek permission to 
hold biopharm cattle in containment anywhere in New Zealand, to produce nutriceutical 
and pharmaceutical commercial products from biopharm milk, and to extend its biopharm 
activity to include goats (NZPA, 2007).  According to General Manager Jimmy Suttie: 
 
The approvals AgResearch will be seeking in 2008 are for a range of activities, 
from pure scientific research, to maintaining transgenic animals in containment 
for the production of speciality milks or milk products (e.g. lactoferrin), and the 
production of biopharmaceutical (medical) proteins. Current commercial projects 
are in both the medical food area and in biopharmaceuticals. (Suttie, 2007) 
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Chapter 3: Uncertainties and Unknowns 
 
The potential benefits and harms of animal biopharming are characterised by significant 
uncertainties and unknowns.  The techniques used for the development of transgenic 
animals are characterised by technical and ethical difficulties (Keefer et al., 2007; Laible 
& Wells, 2007).  The scientific research that may be necessary for a competent evaluation 
of the risks of commercial production is underdeveloped.  Market demand as well as the 
rules and regulations for the development and use of biopharm products are yet to be 
tested.  These uncertainties are reflected in the lack of investor interest noted by Ledford 
(2006: 16):  “Venture capitalists have largely shied away from the technology, and bigger 
pharmaceutical companies have not embraced it either.”  
 
This chapter covers the uncertainties associated with the purported benefits and hazards 
of biopharming.  When risk assessments are carried out, potential hazards that are 
identified are typically weighed against potential benefits.  For this process to be 
robust, the uncertainties around the potential benefits, as well as the potential hazards, 
must be evaluated.  
 
 
3.1.  Uncertainties regarding benefits  
 
3.1.1.  Capacity and competing platforms 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that one of the major economic arguments for biopharming is a 
purported lack of adequate capacity to meet the potential future demand for 
biopharmaceuticals.  However, in a review of these arguments in the journal Nature 
Biotechnology, Thiel (2004) suggests that the biopharmaceutical manufacturing bubble 
may have burst.  He argues that the shortage of Enbrel was an aberration rather than 
indicative of the situation within the industry as a whole, even suggesting that there may 
now in fact be some excess manufacturing capacity worldwide.   
 
Future capacity needs will also be affected by changes to biomanufacturing technologies.  
Improvements have been made in cell-line yields, and disposable bioreactors have been 
developed, introducing more flexibility into lab-based production.   
 
Traditional cell-line manufacturing, whether in microbial or mammalian hosts, is 
advancing in ways that could dramatically change how facilities are built and 
operated.  Potentially revolutionary but commercially unproven transgenic 
production platforms, meanwhile, may become a tougher sell to industry … 
[R]apid advancements in cell-based manufacturing technologies and strategies … 
pose considerable threats to companies hoping to do contract manufacturing in 
transgenic plants or animals. (Thiel, 2004: 1365, 1368) 
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A second major economic argument in support of biopharming claims that it will lower 
production costs.  But according to Thiel (2004: 1369-70), the cost advantages of 
biopharming over traditional methods are now less clear than they appeared at the time of 
the Enbrel supply crisis.   
 
[B]iotech companies looking at options for commercial production of biologics 
see available capacity and a future of increasing efficiency in traditional cell-line 
production …. [T]here is little immediate pressure for companies to move to 
alternative platforms that are as yet commercially unproven. (ibid.: 1370)   
 
Whether any of this will change in response to the ATryn® approval is not yet clear.  
Thiel quotes an industry participant who argues that: 
 
[T]he cost advantage boasted by transgenics will dwindle as traditional 
cell culture manufacturing becomes more productive with new, more 
efficient cell lines … There are a lot of hidden costs in producing 
transgenics that I’m not sure anyone really understands, and I’m not sure 
they will until they do it at scale. (Thiel, 2004: 1371)   
 
Another industry participant doubts that there will be significant cost savings once 
containment costs, the need for purification facilities, and the possibility that additional 
purification steps may be required are figured in (Thiel, 2004: 1371).   
 
Saint-Jore-Dupas et al. (2007) suggest that recent advances in the manipulation of plant 
glycosylation7 mean that what was regarded as a handicap in the use of plants as 
expression systems for the production of recombinant pharmaceutical proteins may turn 
into an advantage, as researchers have been able to humanise the plant-specific 
glycosylation processes.  They see this as a way of overcoming some of the difficulties 
associated with the use of mammalian cells and animal production systems, particularly 
the potential for the transmission of viruses and prion diseases.8
 
It is perhaps worth noting that Texas-based firm Agennix claims that it can produce 
recombinant human lactoferrin through microbial fermentation processes at costs similar 
to those expected to be incurred by Ventria Bioscience’s plant biopharming platform (rice 
engineered with the genes for the production of human lactoferrin) (Wisner, 2005: 16, 
27).  As noted above, in 2005 AgResearch signed a deal with Pharming NV to produce 
recombinant human lactoferrin in cows.  This suggests the possibility that biopharming’s 
cost advantages may be whittled away by competing platforms. 
                                                 
7 “[M]ore than half of the human proteins are glycosylated and their function frequently depends on 
particular glycoforms (glycans) which affect their plasma half-life, tissue targeting and/or biological 
activity.  Similarly, more than one-third of approved biopharmaceuticals are glyco-proteins and both their 
function and efficiency are affected by the presence and composition of their N-glycans” (Saint-Jore-Dupas 
et al., 2007: 317).  (On glycosylation see Box 2, section 3.2.1.) 
8 Others, however, argue that “humanised” plants may pose their own risks in this regard, as “plant viruses 
passing through humanized plants might have altered infectious ranges for both plants and animals” 
(Heinemann, 2007:45). 
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3.1.2.  Scalability and unresolved technical problems 
While the ability to upscale or downscale production rapidly and economically is seen as 
a major economic advantage of biopharming, it is not yet clear how well this applies to 
animal (as opposed to plant) biopharming.  Production of the animal does not of course 
result in immediate production of the product. The candidate dairy species take varying 
but substantial times to reach first lactation (see Chapter 4). 
 
Current technology for generating biopharm animals is beset by problems that could 
affect the economic viability of a commercial operation.9  (The associated animal welfare 
concerns are discussed in section 3.2.4.) Live animals produced through transgenesis or 
as offspring of transgenic animals may be nontransgenic, ‘silent’ (not expressing the 
transgene) or male (Keefer et al., 2007: 2) . While cloning has been used to reduce the 
number of generations needed to produce a transgenic herd, this method is characterised 
by low survival rates and health problems (Dove, 2000: 1046; Laible & Wells, 2007).  
 
The low survival rate of embryos and animals generated by biopharm animal production 
technologies is regarded as one of the problems that must be addressed if biopharming is 
to be a commercially viable strategy for the future (Clark and Whitelaw, 2003: 828).  
According to Fiester (2005:331), with reference to animal cloning in general, only 1-2% 
of transferred embryos result in live offspring.  Laible and Wells (2007: 106) note with 
reference to cloned cattle that in addition to these low rates of live births, a significant 
proportion of the resulting animals die before weaning,. Studies of other animal species 
similarly show high rates of early death and physical abnormalities (Fiester 2005:331-
332).   
 
In relation to the pronuclear microinjection technique used in the creation of transgenic 
animals, Dyck et al. (2003) maintain: 
 
[T]he unpredictability of transgene behaviour is problematic and has lead [sic] to 
the search for alternative gene transfer strategies. However, none of the 
alternatives to date has done so without burdening the transgenic animal 
production system with additional pitfalls. Furthermore, for reproductively 
efficient species, including mice, rabbits and pigs, this inefficiency is less 
prohibitive than for less prolific species, such as goats, sheep and cattle. (Dyck et 
al., 2003: 397)   
 
With pronuclear microinjection, the transgene may incorporate later in the process than 
desired, producing a mosaic animal in which some cells contain the transgene and some 
do not (Keefer et al., 2007). 
 
                                                 
9 The process for establishing a transgenic herd of animals uses both transgenesis and cloning.  Usually 
clones are made from donor cells taken from the transgenic female founder animals (Dove, 2000: 1046; 
GTC Biotherapeutics, n.d.).  
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3.1.3.  Purification 
In 2003, Dyck et al. identified purification as a potential obstacle to animal 
biopharming’s commercialisation: 
 
[T]he raw potential for producing valuable proteins with transgenic animals 
seems apparent. However, the purification of these proteins from their 
source, whether milk, eggs or semen, is still a hurdle to be overcome and 
creates, often undefined, regulatory issues. (Dyck et al., 2003: 396; see also 
Gavin, 2001)   
 
In 2004, purification was seen as the bottleneck for all biologics, whether products of 
transgenic animals or traditional cell-line manufacturing (Thiel, 2004, 1371).  Purification 
of a recombinant protein in commercially viable amounts from the milk of transgenic 
animals is a critical but complicated process with a number of unknowns (Goldman, 
2003: 5).   
 
3.1.4.  Patent issues 
While research using transgenic animals to produce proteins is relatively unconstrained, 
the situation is different for commercial production.  Many of the processes and 
substances involved in commercial biopharming, including processes used in the 
production of transgenic animals, protein characterisation, and the production of 
pharmaceuticals themselves, have already been patented. Negotiating through this patent 
thicket could be time-consuming and expensive. (Dyck, 2003: 397). 
 
As noted above, biopharming is seen by some as a profitable way to avoid or extend 
patents by producing existing drugs in new ways. However, the future for these so-called 
biosimilars (or “biogenerics”) is still unclear.  In an interview reported in Nature 
Biotechnology, Pharming’s chief business officer emphasised that “regulators respond 
more favorably to transgenic proteins developed for unmet needs” (Schmidt, 2006), that 
is, new drugs, and particularly those developed for “orphan”10 diseases. It is not yet clear 
whether regulators will require biosimilar drugs produced through biopharming to go 
through the same approval process as new drugs (Somers, 2007; RSNZ News, 2006(1); 
FDA, n.d.,a), thus eroding their profitability and attractiveness to drug producers.   
 
These potential regulatory requirements are related to the nature of biopharmaceuticals, 
as opposed to drugs produced through chemical synthesis. 
 
[Biopharmaceutical proteins] are in general 100-1,000 times larger than small 
molecules [produced through chemical synthesis], they can’t be fully 
characterized physiochemically by current analytical methods, which are often 
insufficiently sensitive, and their mode of action can confound biological 
characterization in vitro.  Unlike the chemical processes used to synthesize the 
                                                 
10 This terminology refers to rare diseases whose low prevalence makes them financially unattractive as 
research and development targets for pharmaceutical companies under normal circumstances. 
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small molecules, therapeutic proteins are manufactured in living cells, which are 
very sensitive to culture conditions. 
 Even under the most stringently controlled culture conditions, proteins 
show a high degree of heterogeneity (e.g., in glycosylation or in folding).  Often, 
modifications occur as a result of abnormal processing because the recombinant 
proteins are unnatural products for the cellular expression system used.  
Extraction and purification involves [sic] many steps that can also introduce 
protein modifications that influence biological activity or clinical 
properties….Production normally involves many hundreds of control steps, which 
involve numerous in-house standards.  This complexity is the basis of the claim in 
pharmaceutical biotechnology that process is the product…. 
A major problem for generics manufacturers is the lack of access to 
production details, in-house controls and material from different stages of 
production … at the innovator company.   (Schellekens, 2004: 1357, 1358) 
 
This is discussed further in the following section. 
 
3.1.5.  Regulatory uncertainty 
According to Laible & Wells (2007: 111), “one of the [chief contributors] to the slow 
commercial start of transgenic animal products, aside from uncertainties surrounding 
consumer acceptance, is the current status of the regulatory frameworks”.  Concerns that 
arise for regulatory authorities include: drug safety issues, protection of the food chain, 
environmental impacts and animal welfare (Keefer et al., 2007: 7).   
 
Drug safety issues include, for example, the possibility of passing on viral or prion 
infection and the possibility of triggering immune reactions.  Amy Rosenberg of US FDA 
notes:   
 
We would really need assurance that the animals aren’t infected with any kind of 
prion disease.  And each product poses its own unique risk—for instance, 
recombinant versions of endogenous proteins might pose immunogenicity risks 
that you might not encounter if the protein doesn’t have a human counterpart. 
(quoted in Schmidt, 2006) 
 
The fear of transmission of a prion disease (TSE) could be seen as impacting in two ways 
on the possibilities for biopharming in New Zealand – the first being the encouragement 
of the use of New Zealand sourced animals both here and overseas, the second being the 
discouragement of any use of cloven-hoofed animals such as sheep, cattle or goats or 
animal sourced tissues (cell cultures) to produce pharmaceuticals.  The former would 
make New Zealand a source of disease-free animals which could be cloned to further 
reduce the risk, as is under consideration by the FDA (see White, 2005: 2-3).  The latter 
would obviously have a negative impact on New Zealand’s aspirations for a 
biopharmaceutical industry based on this capability.  (This latter possibility was 
suggested to us by one of the scientists we interviewed; it was his view of the direction 
FDA was likely to take.) 
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According to Schellekens (2004: 1357-8): 
 
[P]erhaps the most important difference between small-molecule drugs and 
recombinant proteins is immunogenicity.  Protein biopharmaceuticals induce 
antibodies and these antibodies may have serious clinical consequences.  
 
Others have pointed out, however, that animal biopharming may not differ on these 
points from other platforms already in use, such as mammalian cell lines.  Some FDA 
officials agree; one has been quoted as saying “I don’t see any show stoppers for these 
kinds of products” (quoted in Schmidt, 2006). 
 
The use of animal biopharming to produce biosimilars raises its own regulatory issues.  
Regulatory agencies face particular challenges when it comes to evaluating biosimilars, 
however they are produced. 
  
For regulatory agencies, a key question is how similar the physiochemical 
characteristics of the biosimilar and its patented counterpart need to be to qualify 
for the biosimilar route of marketing authorization.  Even if the biosimilar product 
has the same gene sequence, vector, host cell line, culture conditions and 
purification methods as the innovative protein, it can still differ substantially in its 
biological and clinical properties. (Schellekins, 2004: 1358) 
 
If this is true of biosimilars using the same production methods as the original 
biopharmaceutical, it will presumably apply a fortiori to those using a different 
production platform. 
 
While the regulation of biosimilars is still under debate in the U.S. (Somers, 2007), the 
European Medicines Agency (EMEA) has produced guidelines for evaluating biosimilars 
(Hirschler, 2005).  According to Schellekens (2004: 1357), under these guidelines, the 
biosimilars developer may not have to repeat all of the toxicity studies undertaken by the 
developer of the innovator product.  To make major costs savings, however, it would be 
necessary to avoid repeating expensive clinical studies of efficacy.  The EMEA 
guidelines require that the biosimilar be shown to be similar to the original product “for 
every indication” (ibid.).  Schellekens notes: 
 
[S]ome of the efficacy studies for a biosimilar may need even more patients than 
the original studies because efficacy must be shown to be equivalent to the 
original protein.  In addition, a generic manufacturer will have to generate 
additional data on physiochemical comparability, bioequivalence in animals and 
patients, and clinical data on immunogenicity.  Thus, the biosimilar route may 
turn out to be of even greater complexity than that for a new protein therapeutic. 
(2004: 1359) 
 
This suggests that blanket approval of animal biopharming as a process for the production 
of biosimilars may be unlikely.   
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One could question whether animal biopharming is feasible or desirable without 
extensive and expensive monitoring of the processes and conditions of production. 
Keefer et al. warn that “[t]he stringent health surveillance for potential health hazards in 
the production herd must be factored into the economic equation” (2007: 6).  Not only 
must the purity of the pharmaceutical substance be ensured, but also the surrounding 
environment and the food supply must be protected from inadvertent introduction of 
pharmaceutical substances. It is not yet clear what impact this will have on the 
profitability of biopharming.  
 
Further, the stringency of regulations may depend on whether the product being produced 
is marketed as a nutriceutical or a pharmaceutical.  A nutriceutical is a food or food 
extract that is claimed to have medicinal or health benefits beyond basic nutrition, but is 
not classed as a drug.  While such products may be able to avoid some of the regulatory 
requirements described above, it is not clear whether biopharming will be a cost-effective 
way to produce nutriceuticals.  (See the discussion of lactoferrin in Kaye-Blake et al. 
[2007: 32-33].)  
  
3.1.6.  Who benefits? 
 
There is considerable uncertainty around who is likely to benefit from biopharming, 
should it prove feasible and profitable. 
 
For example, even if animal biopharming does prove to be a cheaper method for 
producing drugs, it does not necessarily follow that either patients or health services will 
benefit from lower drug costs. As Ma et al. (2005: 594) note: “‘Cost of goods’ has 
relatively little impact on the market price of new pharmaceuticals.”   Moreover, as 
suggested above, complex biopharmaceutical  production processes may mean that 
cheaper knock-off drugs will be harder to produce, in which case it is possible to question 
whether the cheaper production methods of animal biopharming will necessarily lead to a 
greater availability or affordability of drugs for patients (Herrera, 2004). (Indeed, MoRST 
[2005:90] has suggested that pharmaceutical companies will focus on biopharming as a 
novel way of producing purer drugs that are harder to copy.)  
 
Whether or not farmers will benefit from biopharming depends on a number of factors, 
including ownership or management arrangements, the impact of patents, and the degree 
of market power. In a report on the potential benefits and hazards for farmers and rural 
communities of plant biopharming, Wisner (2005) asserts that the claims made for 
pharmaceutical crops are inflated and that farmers will not be the beneficiaries.  This is 
because farmers will not be in a position of strength to negotiate with pharmaceutical  
companies, and international competition will be such that farmers will not be able to 
make reasonable profits.  The amount of acreage required to grow pharmaceutical crops 
will be so small compared with commodity crops that it will not affect most farmers 
anyway.  He also did not see rural communities as gaining any benefits unless the related 
research was carried out in nearby universities and processing companies were located in 
the community. Wisner argues that pharmaceutical companies are likely to be the prime 
beneficiaries of plant biopharming.    
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Other issues to consider include the impacts on non-biopharm farmers and the possibility 
that co-existence with biopharm dairying may impact upon markets for non-biopharm 
conventional (and organic) dairy products.  A preliminary economic analysis of the 
hypothetical commercial production of recombinant human lactoferrin (rhLF) in 
biopharm cows, carried out for this research programme, concluded: 
 
[S]ocial science research suggests that introducing a GMO into the New Zealand 
dairy  sector has a potential to cause a minimum of NZ$539.6 million in losses to 
the dairy and tourism industries. Thus, such a biopharming endeavour would need 
to offset those losses before it could be viewed as a net positive for the New 
Zealand economy. Given that sales of lactoferrin are currently in the tens of 
millions of US dollars, offsetting hundreds of millions of NZ dollars of lost 
exports seems unlikely in the short to medium term.  (Kaye-Blake et al., 2007: 33) 
 
 
3.2.  Uncertainties regarding hazards 
 
3.2.1.  Health risks for humans from biopharm drugs 
Amy Rosenberg, supervisory medical officer with the US Food and Drug 
Administration’s (FDA) Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, places health risks 
from biopharm drugs into four categories: infection; allergenic responses; immunogenic 
responses; and “autoimmune reactions arising should transgenic proteins break tolerance 
to their endogenous, self-protein counterparts” (quoted in Schmidt, 2006).  
 
Many have focused on the potential for drugs made with animal bioreactors to transmit 
disease.  For example, Laible & Wells (2007: 113) state, “The main safety concerns for 
pharmaceutical proteins derived from transgenic animals are the contamination with 
infectious agents (in particular prions in cattle).”  Prions are associated with 
Transmissible Spongioform Encephalopathies (TSEs), including BSE, variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) and scrapie.  Processes for reducing the risk of prion 
diseases include the use of scrapie-free animals in the production of any products which 
could potentially transmit a TSE (White, 2005).  As New Zealand and Australia are the 
only countries to be declared scrapie-free, this has obvious importance for New Zealand.   
 
Prion proteins are protein aggregates that transmit a trait as if they were based on DNA 
(Campbell, 1998; Keyes, 1999; Weld, 2002). Some suggest that prion diseases could 
develop in the community through the use of genetically modified animals (Weaver, 
2003: 25).  This may happen if a prion is consumed through drinking the cow’s milk 
(U.S National Research Council, 2002: 52).  In the case of prions, the infection requires a 
highly similar protein to be part of the normal proteins in the exposed recipient.  
However, all proteins have the capacity to aggregate, even if all do not become 
infectious, and there remains the formal possibility that other deleterious effects arise 
from aggregation itself (e.g., Bucciantini, 2002).  Transgenic animals may be more prone 
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to deposit protein aggregates composed of the recombinant protein because the protein is 
usually produced at unnaturally high concentrations in recombinant animals or because 
the cell physiology of the recombinant animal is outside of the biophysical conditions of 
the source species (Tartaglia, 2007).   
 
Other hazards may be linked to the techniques used to produce transgenic animals. The 
use of the transgenesis technique of pronuclear microinjection can produce unpredictable 
changes in the resulting organism (Dyck, 2003: 397; Keefer et al., 2007: 2).  For 
example, the milk produced by transgenic animals can have quite different characteristics 
from ‘normal’ milk.  Laible & Wells, reporting on their attempts to change the casein 
content of bovine milk, note: 
 
Interestingly, the simple increase in gene dosage for two milk proteins 
resulted in complex changes including effects on the production of some 
other milk proteins, mineral balance and physical appearance.  Although not 
necessarily unexpected, complex changes as a result of genetic modification 
are difficult to predict and can only be assessed in the transgenic animals 
once generated. (2007: 115)   
 
This example illustrates one of the important problems associated with the production of 
proteins from transgenic animals: how can non-obvious unanticipated changes be 
identified in transgenic animals if one does not know what to look for?  Elbehri (2005: 
20) and Saint-Jore-Dupas et al. (2007) perceive this to be an advantage of using plant, 
rather than animal, bioreactors, on the grounds that unexpected pathological changes are 
more likely to be transmissible to humans from animals than from plants.11   
 
In terms of its impact on health risks, the glycosylation process is discussed as both an 
advantage and a risk of animal biopharming.  Laible & Wells (2007: 113) point out that 
immune responses can occur “due to slightly varied glycosylation patterns compared with 
the native human equivalent”.   This is a concern for regulators because “although the 
transgene may code for a human protein, modifications may be made to the protein 
during its production in the transgenic animals” (Keefer et al, 2007: 7).  (See Box 2 
below.)  Not only that, but “altered glycosylation patterns can affect the amount of time 
before a protein is cleared from a patient’s system which can affect treatment protocols” 
(ibid.).  Schmidt (2006) points out that it was concern about these two problems that held 
up EMEA’s approval process for ATryn®. 
 
However, as noted above, others maintain that animal biopharming may not differ in this 
regard from other techniques already in use for the production of biopharmaceuticals, 
such as those using mammalian cell lines (e.g., Laible & Wells, 2007: 113).   
                                                 
11 But see Heinemann (2007). 
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Box 2: Post-translational modifications and glycoproteins  
 
 
The primary structure of proteins is the linear order of amino acids which compose 
them. Proteins are more than just a sequence of amino acids, however. They may also 
be modified by addition of different kinds of molecules to various amino acids. This is 
relevant to risk assessment because the modifications can alter protein structure and 
function, as well as change the potential for the protein to be a toxin or allergen.  
 
There are many forms of post-translational modifications. Most are the addition of 
molecules, but some modifications result from removing amino acids or re-folding a 
protein into an alternative three dimensional structure. The range of potential post-
translational modifications varies by species, tissue and stage of development 
(Gomord et al., 2005).  
 
Modification has medical and food relevance because, for example, proteins modified 
in plants can be immunogenic in humans (e.g. Prescott et al., 2005) and may cause 
cross-reactivity to similar epitopes (i.e., immunogenic regions) that occur in proteins 
from animal sources. The same protein can exist in hundreds to thousands of different 
isoforms in the same cell at the same time, but each form may not exist at the same 
concentration. Thus, detecting different forms can be very difficult. 
 
More than 300 different types of chemical modifications are known, and are 
distributed among the following types: ubiquitination, halogenation, phosphorylation, 
farnesylation, glycosylation, glycoxidation, acetylation and methylation (Manzi et al., 
2000, Zasloff, 2002). Over half of all proteins are glycosylated (Van den Steen et al., 
1998). No modification is exclusive, so multiple isoforms of the “same” protein, 
distinguished by different combinations of modifications and groups of modifications, 
can co-exist (Lane and Beese, 2006, Norregaard Jensen, 2004). 
 
Glycoforms of a protein are sugar-modified variants of the same primary amino acid 
polymer. The three main post-translational protein modifications that use sugars are 
N- and O-linked glycosylation and glycosyl phosphatidyl inositol (GPI) anchors (Van 
den Steen et al., 1998). Linkage to the polypeptide is made at serine, threonine and 
hydroxylysine amino acids (O-linked) or via the amide nitrogen of asparagine (N-
linked) (Bardor et al., 1999, Mitra et al., 2006). 
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3.2.2.  Contamination of the food supply 
One of the main risks of animal biopharming involving cows is the possibility of 
biopharm milk entering the food supply. This could have effects on human health, the 
dairy industry’s ability to export milk, and the ability of consumers and producers to 
decide what to purchase or sell.  The U.S. National Research Council (2002:54) 
recommended excluding animals from biopharm operations from the food chain.   
 
There has already been at least one case of possible inadvertent contamination of the 
food supply by animal biopharming.  In 2001 to 2003, the University of Illinois released 
356 pigs, which were part of their transgenic biopharming experiments to produce certain 
proteins in the milk of sows, to livestock dealers. The university argued that the pigs did 
not contain the genes of their parent stock nor were they old enough to be lactating; 
however, investigations by the FDA found that records were inadequately kept and they 
were unable to verify this (FDA investigates improper disposal of bioengineered pigs, 
2003). 
 
Producing biopharmaceutical milk raises further issues. As the valuable protein is 
produced in the animals’ milk, and animals lactate in order to feed offspring, it is not 
possible to produce the milk without the birth of new offspring. Transgenic animals will 
essentially be worthless if not needed for the herd and not welcome in the food chain. It 
is not unlikely, therefore, that biopharm operators will seek approval for excess animals 
to be permitted in human food or animal feed (U.S National Research Council, 2002: 
54).  There may be similar attempts to derive value from the milk from biopharm animals 
that is not required or suitable for pharmaceutical production. 
 
The following examples may shed some light on the potential costs of contamination of 
the food supply with biopharm products.  Although they involve plants rather than 
animals, they are indicative of the types of costs resulting from contamination and shed 
some light on this risk in relation to animal biopharming. In 2000, GM Starlink corn, 
which was not approved for human consumption, was detected in human foods in the 
United States.12  It cost approximately US$1,000,000,000 to recall the contaminated 
food, clean the processing and storage facilities, and settle lawsuits (Smyth, 
Khachatourians & Phillips, 2002). Japan temporarily ceased importing U.S corn from 
October 27, 2000, until they were confident that testing mechanisms for Starlink were 
adequate. It has been estimated that the Starlink episode resulted in losses of between 
$26 and $288 million dollars for producers in the U.S.  (Schmitz, Schmitz & Moss, 
2005). 13   
 
In 2002, ProdiGene was fined US$250,000 for contamination of other crops with a 
biopharm corn. 
                                                 
12 The Starlink gene Cry9C was found in a sample of Taco Bell shells on September 18, 2000 (Schmitz, 
Schmitz & Moss, 2005). The gene was detected later in other foods. 
13  Mullholland et al. v. Aventis Crop Science USA Holding, Inc. was a case filed by non-Starlink corn 
growers who claimed damages from contamination. This involved loss of market value as well as storage 
and transportation costs resulting from contamination (Schmitz, Schmitz & Moss, 2005: 392).  The case 
was settled for $110 million in 2003.  
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[T]est plots of [biopharm] corn [were] being raised under contract by local 
growers, one farm in Nebraska and another in Iowa. In the Nebraska case, 
officials realized that some 500,000 bushels of harvested soybeans were 
contaminated with small amounts of GM corn, which had been grown during 
2001 on the same plot, because the farmer did not weed "volunteer" plants from 
the field in which the soy was grown. In Iowa, federal officials required a local 
producer to destroy some 155 acres of corn because it could have been cross-
pollinated by ProdiGene's engineered corn being raised in a nearby field. (Fox, 
2003:3) 
 
The settlement reached with the USDA also required ProdiGene to reimburse the USDA 
for the costs of cleaning up the contamination and to post a US$1 million bond (Fox, 
2003).   
 
In August 2006, as harvesting began, many American rice growers discovered through an 
announcement from USDA, that they had inadvertently planted rice contaminated by 
Bayer’s GM rice resistant to its herbicide Liberty.  This rice had never proceeded beyond 
testing between 1998 and 2001 and had never been approved.  The company selling the 
seed rice, Riceland Foods, had first heard of the problem in January and tested seed and 
found it positive.  They had tested again in May and again received positive results which 
were confirmed by Bayer, but had not notified farmers.  Different groups of farmers 
proceeded to file class actions against Bayer Crop Science and Riceland Foods 
(Verderosa, 2006; Bennett, 2006; Farm Futures, 2006).  
 
3.2.3.  Gene transfer   
Large animals are regarded by some as safer to use in biopharming than smaller animals 
or plants because they are easier to contain (Pollack, 2003: 59). Larger animals are easier 
to see, and therefore escapes are easier to detect and escapees are easier to catch.  Escape 
poses the risk that the biopharm animal(s) will breed with non-biopharm animals and 
potentially disseminate the transgenes and their associated epigenetic effects. Some 
animals (such as cows) have also been argued to be preferable to plants for biopharming 
in some contexts because of the absence of wild populations of animals with which they 
could interbreed (Clark & Whitelaw, 2003: 832).     
 
However, the risk of horizontal (or lateral) gene transfer (HGT)14 is also potentially an 
issue of concern, as the genetic material that “programmes” the expression of the 
recombinant protein, may also be contained in blood, secretions, faecal matter and other 
waste material.  This could be ingested or spread by other organisms or animals. For 
example, blood-sucking insects (Kidwell, 1993; Houck, 1991) or soil bacteria 
(Heinemann, 2004) could become affected by, or vectors for the spread of, the altered 
genetic material.  This is debated within the risk assessment field.  The National 
Research Council suggests, “Although there is no example yet of acquisition of any gene, 
including drug resistance markers, by bacterial flora living in a transgenic animal, the 
                                                 
14 The transfer of genetic material other than from parent to offspring.  
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spread of introduced genes remains a possibility, albeit remote” (U.S National Research 
Council, 2002: 52).   
 
The fact that horizontal gene transfer has been found to be a substantial contributor to 
genome evolution may suggest that the possibility is less remote than was once thought.  
This is unambiguously the case for prokaryotes (i.e., bacteria) (Heinemann, 1999; 
Heinemann, 2004), and genes in eukaryotic genomes (including multicellular organisms 
such as humans) owe their origins to HGT or the vectors of HGT (de la Cruz, 2000; 
Doolittle, 1999; Gogarten, 2005; Syvanen, 2002; Dunning Hotopp et al., 2007). A recent 
study by Dunning Hotopp et al. (2007) has demonstrated widespread transfer of bacterial 
genes into the genome of numerous invertebrates. Some believe that it is a serious risk 
that has not been studied sufficiently or taken seriously enough to date (Heinemann, 
2007).   
 
The “generation of potentially pathogenic viruses by recombination between sequences 
of the vector used to introduce a transgene and related, but non-pathogenic, viruses that 
might be present in the same animal” (U.S. National Research Council, 2002: 52) is one 
possible outcome of horizontal gene transfer.  It has been demonstrated in principle using 
tissue culture cells infected by a natural and a genetically modified vaccine virus that 
gave rise to different recombinant offspring viruses (Hansen, 2004). 
 
Interactions between “natural” viruses and the elements of transgenes are already well 
documented in plants, and there is no scientific basis for not expecting similar types of 
genetic interactions to occur in animals.  For example, when two genes run by 
homologous promoters come to be together in the same plant cell, both genes may be 
silenced. This can result in inadvertent silencing of agronomic traits.  Bhullar et al. (2003: 
988) note, with reference to the cauliflower mosaic virus [CaMV] 35S promoter, which 
has been widely used in transgenesis, that “repetitive use of the same promoter is known 
to induce transgene inactivation due to promoter homology”.  
 
Al-Kaff et al. (2000) showed directly that infection of susceptible plants with CaMV can 
cause silencing of a herbicide tolerance transgene with a 35S promoter.  The silencing 
effect is caused by dsRNA-mediated mechanisms which are conserved throughout the 
plant and animal kingdoms.  Moreover, in non-mammalian animals, the effect has been 
demonstrated to be heritable (Cogoni, 2000). 
 
Further, as noted above, prion proteins are protein aggregates that transmit a trait as if 
they were based on DNA.  Aggregates of proteins can be extremely stable.  Prions are 
known to persist through conditions that would normally denature the same protein that 
was not in aggregate form, including autoclaving.  In the case of chronic wasting disease 
(CWD) in cervids (deer family), prions persist in infectious form for at least two years in 
the soil on land previously inhabited by infected deer (Johnson, 2006). 
 
This raises an important point in relation to HGT: prions and other types of molecules 
that form epigenes must be considered along with the better known agents composed of 
DNA. However, research of this kind lags far behind work on DNA and RNA viruses. 
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Nevertheless, epigenetic engineering is rapidly becoming a reality. Recently researchers 
from both China and the US seed company Monsanto demonstrated that dsRNA can be 
infectiously transferred through food to gut cells in insects, and subsequently spread 
within the animals (Baum et al., 2007; Gordon and Waterhouse, 2007; Mao et al., 2007). 
Regardless of whether the dsRNA is created by design or by accident, it is now clear that 
it can have significant biological impact. This issue is of particular relevance to 
biopharming, because dsRNA is also a potential therapeutic (e.g. O'Neill, 2007, Osborne, 
2007, Zhou et al., 2004). 
 
The possibility of HGT may limit the kinds of pharmaceutical substances that can, or 
should, be produced through biopharming.  According to MoRST (2005: 70), animals 
could also be a source of new classes of antibiotics that could overcome the growing 
problem of bacteria resistant to conventional antibiotics.  However, through horizontal 
gene transfer, the farming of animals modified to contain antibiotic substances in their 
blood, flesh or secretions could in fact aggravate the problem of antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria by encouraging resistance in populations of soil bacteria or bacteria that are the 
animal’s natural commensals (which may often contaminate food produced from the 
animals).  The degree to which this may be a problem will depend on the scale of the 
biopharming operations and the longevity of the animals.  Other constructs with 
antimicrobial properties, such as recombinant human lactoferrin, may pose similar risks. 
(Many therapeutic compounds have antimicrobial properties in addition to their intended 
action [Heinemann et al., 2000].) 
 
The implications of HGT for the feasibility of biopharming may be significant, impacting 
on all movement off the property, including stock, waste and carcasses, equipment, 
baleage, vehicles, etc. Other issues involve the flow of ground and surface water 
(including the impacts of irrigation and flooding) and blood-sucking insects (Nature 
Biotechnology, 2002). 
 
3.2.4.  Animal welfare 
It is acknowledged that there are significant animal-welfare problems associated with the 
methods used to generate biopharm animals (Keefer et al., 2007; Laible & Wells, 2007; 
PEW, 2004; Dove, 2000; Fiester, 2005).  Studies in a range of species have shown that 
“many clones display various abnormalities” (Laible and Wells, 2007: 105).  These 
abnormalities result in the high mortality rates mentioned earlier, but can also result in 
health problems for surviving animals: “[a]berrations that occur early in embryonic, 
placental or foetal development may not necessarily prove lethal but may impair health in 
adulthood” (Ogura et al. 2002; Loi et al. 2006, both cited in Laible and Wells, 2007).  
They can also generate health problems for the cloned animals’ offspring (Wilmut et al., 
2002, cited in Laible and Wells), that is, the unintended pathological changes can be 
transgenerational.  These aberrant patterns of gene expression in clones, say Laible and 
Wells (2007:103) raise “animal welfare concerns that currently limit the acceptability and 
the applicability of the technology.” 
 
Many cloned and transgenic embryos suffer from “large calf syndrome”, a developmental 
phenomenon that was first noted in nuclear transfer methods used in cattle (Dove, 2000: 
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1047; Laible & Wells, 2007: 106; Fiester, 2005: 332).   This syndrome causes dystocia, 
or difficult birth, for the incubating animal.  If the calf is not delivered through caesarean 
section it can cause suffering and death for the cow and/or the calf. Cows giving birth to 
cloned calves also demonstrate both prolonged gestation and less preparation for 
parturition (Laible & Wells, 2007: 105-107). 
 
Also of concern is the much-increased tendency for cows to develop hydroallantois, or 
hydrops.  This develops in the second half of gestation; it usually renders the calf non-
viable and requires induced abortion to protect the cow.  While hydrops occurs naturally 
in around 0.02% of bovine pregnancies and in about 0.07% of artifical insemination and 
5% of IVF cases, with clones the rate is typically 25%.  In response to this, efforts are 
underway to develop techniques for identifying non-viable pregnancies at an earlier stage 
(Laible and Wells 2007: 106). 
 
Cloned animals are more prone to musculoskeletal abnormalities and, perhaps 
particularly significant for biopharming, compromised immune systems. As noted above, 
abnormalities may not reveal themselves before the animal enters a production system, 
while some epigenetic aberrations may not show themselves in any obvious “external” or 
phenotypical way (Laible and Wells 2007: 105-6).  (On these and other animal welfare 
issues see also MoRST, 2005; Fiester, 2005: 332; and Dyck et al., 2003; and FDA, 2007.)   
 
Other animal-welfare problems can arise when animals are engineered to produce 
substances that may in themselves affect the animal.   
 
[C]ertain bioactive proteins produced in milk can have adverse affects on 
the animal’s health. This is particularly true when they are produced at high 
concentrations and the protein can be reabsorbed. This limits the use of this 
type of recombinant protein production system [i.e., animal biopharming] to 
inactive or non-interfering proteins” (Dyck, 2003: 395; see also Echelard et 
al., 2006: 37).   
 
Laible & Wells (2007: 116) provide the example of an antimicrobial in milk which has 
“the potential to compromise the biological function of milk as a food to rear young or 
for other processing applications” and cites the expression of a particular agent in mice 
which delayed the “mammary development postpartum and [resulted in] lower growth 
rates in suckling pups”.  This limitation on the kinds of proteins that can be produced 
through animal biopharming is said by some (e.g., Toledo, 2006) to be an argument in 
favour of focusing on other production platforms.  
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Chapter 4: Scenarios for Biopharming in New Zealand 
 
A robust assessment of potential benefits and harms of biopharming requires knowledge 
of relevant practices, and practices are in part the product of ownership and operational 
factors. This chapter presents a discussion of those factors and nominates four 
representative ownership/operational scenarios for commercial biopharming in New 
Zealand.  Commercial biopharming will have to abide by any conditions imposed by 
ERMA; we also, therefore, describe what those conditions are likely to be.  This is 
derived from the conditions ERMA has imposed on biopharm field trials.   
 
Many of the people we interviewed from government and some from CRIs were 
supportive of the idea that if biopharming becomes viable, it will probably occur in New 
Zealand. As already noted, AgResearch has signed an agreement with Netherlands-based 
company Pharming (NV) to work toward the commercialisation of recombinant human 
lactoferrin produced in cows’ milk.  It is intended that AgResearch will develop the 
capacity for market-scale production of the protein; the partnership also involves the 
development of biopharm protein purification capabilities within New Zealand.  
AgResearch has received approval by ERMA to field-test biopharm cows under a 
previous decision given in 2002 to allow the development of GM cattle for non-
commercial purposes.  ERMA, however, has not (yet) given AgResearch approval to 
develop commercial herds of the transgenic cows, as several sources suggest AgResearch 
plans to do (Atkinson, 2005; Pharming NV, 2005; Taylor, 2005; Suttie, 2007).15  It 
appears that AgResearch plans to seek approval for commercialisation in 2008 (Suttie, 
2007). 
 
Before turning to specific ownership and operational factors, we note that any 
commercial biopharming scenario would presumably depend upon the following 
requirements being met: 
 
1. There has been a reduction to an acceptable level of the animal-welfare problems 
associated with the production of transgenic animals. 
2. Sufficient funding or venture capital has been attained and/or strategic alliances 
formed to provide the investment required to see the product through to 
commercial production. 
3. Clinical trials have demonstrated the claimed efficacy or equivalence of the 
product to the satisfaction of the appropriate regulatory agencies. 
4. The processes of production and purification have been approved by the relevant 
regulatory agencies  
                                                 
15 For example, a press release by Pharming (NV) commenting on its commercial agreement with 
AgResearch states, “AgResearch shall bear costs associated with the initial production of rhLF 
[recombinant human lactoferrin] and support the commercialization of rhLF through its extensive network 
in the South Pacific and Asia. (Pharming Group N.V., 2005)”.  
 35
Constructive Conversations/Kōrero Whakaaetanga Rpt 12 
 
5. The production process is capable of producing commercial quantities of the 
pharmaceutical substance satisfying the required standards for purity. 
6. The biopharm animals have been approved for conditional or general release by 
ERMA.   
 
 
4.1.  The biopharming enterprise 
 
The following discussion presents the major variables relevant to the shape of the 
commercial biopharming enterprise in New Zealand. 
 
4.1.1.   The animals most likely to be used  
A number of different animals can potentially be used as “bioreactors” to produce 
biopharmaceuticals.  The type of animal used will naturally have an effect on the size and 
production structure of each operation, as well as the actors and social practices involved.   
 
4.1.1.1.  Dairy Cattle 
 
As has already been noted, it is argued that New Zealand has certain attributes which 
would favour the production of biopharmaceuticals through the milk produced by dairy 
cows.  In summary, the reasons are the freedom from TSE diseases, the biosecurity 
system that protects this status, the research expertise in cloning and transgenic cattle, 
and the farming and management experience, as well as existing infrasture, for dairying.   
 
It is likely that considerably fewer cows will be needed to produce pharmaceuticals than 
are used in traditional dairy operations. The size of the herd will depend on the demand 
for the drug as well as on the concentration at which the biopharmaceutical substance is 
produced in the milk.  For example, it is estimated that a herd of 25 cows genetically 
modified to produce human insulin could produce enough to provide for Argentina’s 
1.5m diabetics (RSNZ News, 2007a).  The size of the herd, in turn, will affect what 
management system is required.  
 
4.1.1.2.  Goats 
 
Although our interviews with scientists indicated that there no research was being 
conducted in New Zealand on biopharming with goats, internationally goats have 
become the first animal approved for commercial production as bioreactors (see Table 1). 
As noted earlier, the European Medicines Agency has approved the marketing of 
recombinant human antithrombin produced by GTC Biotherapeutics from biopharm 
goats in the US. In a late 2007 communication that explicitly cited this decision, 
AgResearch announced its intention to expand its biopharming activities to include goats 
(Suttie 2007).   
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As goats produce less milk than cows (on average 600 to 800L per natural lactation per 
doe) (Echelard et al., 2006: 40), it is likely that more goats will be needed for production 
than cows.  According to Echelard et al. (2006: 40):  
 
[A] few hundred transgenic does can … easily yield several hundred 
kilograms of purified product per year.  This level of production can meet 
the manufacturing needs of several factors traditionally derived from plasma 
fractionation and for a large number of recombinant antibodies currently in 
development.   
 
If this is the case, production methods and ownership structures could differ from those 
for cows.  The number of goats needed for the operation could be similar to the size of 
the typical New Zealand goat farm.  As of 2002, there were roughly 150 goats per goat 
farm in New Zealand(Meat and Wool New Zealand, 2005: 1).  
  
One interview with a member of the Goat Breeders Association indicated a move toward 
indoor facilities for goat farming. This has become a popular way of farming goats as it 
controls for infestations of intestinal worms, for which goats do not have a natural 
immunity. Thus, it may be likely that biopharm goats would be kept indoors.16  The fact 
that wild goats are still prevalent in some parts of New Zealand may result in a 
requirement that biopharm goats be kept indoors in order to reduce the risk of escape and 
interbreeding.  
 
Whilst interviews indicated that the Dairy Goat Co-operative is not currently interested in 
this option, there was no indication that it has been completely rejected for the future. 
However, goat-milk producers currently supply some sensitive, higher-value markets, 
such as that for infant formula, and our interviewees indicated reluctance to embark on 
any form of production that might jeopardise their access to those markets.  The needs of 
the Dairy Goat Co-operative will presumably be considered in relation to AgResearch’s 
application to ERMA to biopharm goats. 
 
4.1.1.3.  Sheep 
 
Currently there are no transgenic sheep in New Zealand. It is not clear whether field tests 
will be attempted again using sheep.  While AgResearch’s recent announcement of its 
intention to expand its research and development of transgenic animals encompasses 
sheep, to this point references to biopharm animals have been limited to cows and goats 
(Suttie, 2007). It is uncertain whether the PPL experience exerts a positive or negative 
impact on the likely development of the use of sheep for animal biopharming in New 
Zealand. One interviewee viewed the PPL experience as having demonstrated “proof of 
concept”, providing a basis for future developments.  Although New Zealand does not 
have a strong sheep-milk sector, it does hold expertise in the farming of sheep. 
 
                                                 
16 The GTC Bioteherapeutics’ goats are housed indoors but are able to spend time outside in pens 
(Redherring, 2006). 
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4.1.1.4.  Chickens 
 
Currently there are no commercial biopharm operations using chickens; however, 
scientists at the University of Georgia in Athens have worked with chickens in order to 
express new enzymes in eggs, albeit in small quantities (Pickrell, 2002). There are 
several advantages to using chickens for transgenic operations. Firstly, there are well-
established methods for extracting the protein from eggs, and some scientists predict the 
process will be much the same for transgenic eggs (Pickrell, 2002). Half of the protein in 
egg white, ovalbumin, can be used to produce therapeutic recombinant proteins (Lillico 
et al., 2007).  Secondly, reproduction times are shorter and reproduction rates are higher 
than those of the mammals discussed above (Pickrell, 2002; Harvey et al., 2002). Lastly, 
it is suggested that “glycosylation patterns of IgGs [immunoglobulin G] in chickens in 
some aspects resemble those in humans more than do those of goats, cows and sheep” 
(Harvey et al., 2002: 397).  
 
Poultry have not been easy subjects for transgenesis (Dyck et al., 2003: 395), though 
more recently Ivarie (2006) contended that this is changing.  Researchers have 
successfully produced a humanised antibody for the treatment of advanced melanoma 
and interferon beta-1a from eggs (Lillico et al., 2007). 
 
Our interviews suggested that the lack of poultry research in New Zealand makes it 
unlikely that poultry will be developed for biopharming here.  This may not, however, 
preclude a New Zealand operation carrying out contracted production with chickens 
supplied by the overseas contracting company. 
 
* 
 
During the course of this research, many factors pointed to dairy cows as the most likely 
animal to be used in any biopharming operation in New Zealand.  Our scenarios are built 
upon this assumption.  However, in light of the recent AgResearch announcement and the 
Atryn decision, the use of goats has also become a strong prospect.  Key factors 
additional to those considered in our scenarios that should be taken into account in 
relation to biopharming goats include: the size of the biopharm herd in relation to 
conventional farm operations and the implications of this for ownership/management 
structures; the implications of goat biopharming for access to existing markets for high-
value conventional goat-milk products; the presence of feral goats in New Zealand and its 
implications for containability; and the possibility of keeping biopharm goats in indoor 
facilities and the implications of this for the relative risks associated with horizontal gene 
transfer.  Finally, given New Zealand’s capacity and expertise in sheep farming and its 
freedom from scrapie and TSEs, the possibility that sheep will be used for biopharming in 
New Zealand also cannot be excluded.  
 
 
4.1.2.  Production and maintenance of a biopharm herd  
Every ownership and operational scenario requires the production and maintenance of a 
biopharm herd. As discussed in Chapter 3, the technology necessary for this is still under 
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development.  It appears that in its biopharming research, AgResearch has been 
experimenting with various combinations: transgenic semen x conventional cows, 
transgenic semen x transgenic cows, and conventional semen x transgenic cow.17 More 
recently (see section 2.3), their work has included the implantation of imported transgenic 
embryos into conventional cows.   
 
Biopharm founder animals are produced through the creation of transgenic embryos that 
have been transfected with the human genetic construct for the production of the required 
protein.  These embryos are implanted into conventional recipient cows.  Successful 
offspring animals can then be cloned, or, presumably, be allowed to reproduce naturally 
or through artificial insemination.  The semen from transgenic bulls can be used for 
artifical insemination with conventional cows (in vivo fertilisation) or for in vitro 
fertilisation to produce transgenic embryos. Conversely, transgenic cows, similarly 
produced, can be used with conventional or transgenic semen.  As noted, transgenic 
embryos could also be imported, then implanted into conventional cows in New Zealand.   
 
If pregnancy is intended only for the purpose of inducing lactation in the transgenic cow, 
it may be irrelevant whether the semen is conventional or transgenic.  It is not clear at this 
stage whether techniques for artificially inducing lactation are feasible or likely to be 
used.  If pregnancy is used to induce lactation, most of the resulting calves would likely 
be aborted or destroyed after birth, particularly if they are male; female calves not needed 
for replacement purposes may also be destroyed once the desired herd size has been 
reached.  Thus, disposal of unwanted offspring would remain a significant part of 
ongoing biopharm operations. 
 
4.1.3.  Type of farming operation: separate or combined? 
A biopharming operation could be included within a larger conventional operation, with 
biopharmed cows being kept separate for milking purposes in the same way that cows 
receiving antibiotics or cows producing colostrum are kept separate now.  Biopharm 
cows could be tagged in such a way that they are recognisable, or they could be run as a 
separate herd brought in for milking before or after the conventional herd, or milked in a 
separate facility altogether.     
 
The alternative scenario is that of a completely self-contained farm with only biopharm 
animals for milk production.  However, if it produced its own replacement animals, such 
a farm may have a mix of conventional and transgenic stock, because conventional 
recipient cows are often used as surrogate mothers for cloned transgenic embryos.   
 
4.1.4.  Nutriceutical or pharmaceutical? 
As noted in Chapter 3, biopharming may be used to produce compounds marketed as 
nutriceuticals (food or food extracts claimed to have added health benefits) rather than 
pharmaceuticals.  Interviews with key actors indicated that the decision to produce 
                                                 
17 See the documents associated with ERMA applications GMF98009 and GMD2028, available through the 
ERMA website (www.ermanz.govt.nz).  
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nutriceuticals may come down to economic considerations: e.g., relative costs of 
development, size of the market and premium obtainable. 
 
It is thus relevant to note that in early 2006 Pharming NV, with whom AgResearch has 
contracted with the aim of producing recombinant human lactoferrin (rhLF) in cows, filed 
a Generally Regarded as Safe, or GRAS, notice with the USFDA. 18  The notice is for the 
use of rhLF in functional foods.  The FDA has not yet responded to the notice. 19
 
Pharming’s chief business officer said in 2006:  
 
We're talking to some manufacturers and nutritional companies in the US about 
the possibilities of using it as a standalone product or an ingredient in foods. A lot 
will depend on the partner, and relate to the end product. It may require additional 
end studies, for example if it is used in infant foods. (Quoted in Patton, 2006) 
 
The majority of existing sales of bovine lactoferrin are in Asia,  
 
where lactoferrin supplements are common and dairy companies fortify yoghurts 
with the protein. This market is also likely to be more accepting of Pharming's 
technology….The company may need to reassure future partners in Europe and 
the US about the safety of this technology although Singh is confident that 
attitudes are changing. (Patton, 2006) 
 
AgResearch’s agreement with Pharming includes “support[ing] the commercialisation of 
the ingredient in the South Pacific and Asia” (Taylor, 2005).   Thus there appears to be 
good reason to anticipate nutriceutical-oriented commercial biopharming initiatives in 
New Zealand.  (See also the promotion of nutriceutical/functional food production in the 
report of the Food and Beverage Task Force [2006] and recent FRST funding.) 
 
                                                 
18 The GRAS notification program is a voluntary procedure that “is intended to replace the GRAS 
affirmation process by providing a mechanism whereby a person may inform FDA of a determination that 
the use of a substance is GRAS, rather than petition FDA to affirm that the use of a substance is GRAS” 
(FDA, n.d.,b).   Freese (2007: 15-16) describes the ensuing process as follows: 
If FDA has no questions, it issues a letter of no objection, which explicitly notes that the 
manufacturer bears responsibility for the safety of the new ingredient. If FDA has concerns 
regarding the safety of the ingredient, it informs the manufacturer of the outstanding issues, which 
must be addressed to FDA’s satisfaction…. The major weakness of the GRAS process is the 
reliance on company-prepared  “summaries” of studies they have conducted, which often present 
only results and lack crucial methodological details needed for a critical evaluation. 
According to FDA, its acceptance of a GRAS notification “is not an approval” (FDA, n.d., b.). Why make a 
GRAS notification? “You may market a substance that you determine to be GRAS for a particular use 
without informing FDA ...  We recognize, however, that some firms prefer to know that FDA has reviewed 
its notice of a GRAS determination, without raising safety or legal issues, before marketing.” (ibid.) 
19 In December 2004, Ventria Bioscience filed a GRAS notification with FDA for rhLF for use in foods, 
beverages and medical foods.  Two years later it withdrew the notice.  In its letter announcing the 
withdrawal, FDA notes: “Although you have withdrawn your notice and FDA has ceased to evaluate the 
notice, FDA, nevertheless, plans to engage the wider scientific community for further consideration of the 
complex scientific issues in your notice.” (Accessed at www.cfsan.fda.gov/%7Erdb/opa-g162.html) 
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It is not yet clear what this will mean for biopharm farming operations.  On the one hand, 
GRAS status may lead to the conclusion that health hazards from contamination of the 
food chain are minimal and thus to the downgrading of containment requirements.  
(However, as GM food is required to be labelled as such in New Zealand and in many 
export markets, segregation would still be required.)  On the other hand, as already noted, 
many such substances (including rhLF) have antimicrobial properties, suggesting that 
risks associated with HGT may remain. 
 
4.1.5.  Ownership  
The operation of animal biopharming will be dependent on the management and 
ownership structures in place.  There are three basic stages in the production of a 
biopharmed pharmaceutical, which present different ownership possibilities.  First, the 
transgenic animals have to be produced.  Second, these animals are farmed to produce the 
raw unprocessed form of the product.  If this is milk, then the process of farming involves 
not only the feeding and care of the animals, but also milking them and keeping them 
lactating.  Third, the raw product is taken somewhere to be purified and processed or 
formulated into a marketable product.  Each of these stages could be carried out by the 
same or different owners or organisations, and each could be carried out in different 
places from the rest or at the same place. 
 
In summary, there could be different permutations and combinations around the 
ownership and operations of: 
1. production of animals and replacement stock 
2. farming of animals and production of raw product 
3. processing from raw to saleable product. 
 
4.1.5.1.  Who owns the animals? 
 
Our interviews indicated that it is most likely that animals will be owned by the 
developer (a biotech or pharmaceutical company) that produces them, while managed by 
farmers under contract.  However, other options are possible, such as individuals or 
groups of farmers organising themselves to own the cows, again working with a 
particular biotech or pharmaceutical company, but on a somewhat different footing, as is 
done with share milking at present.20  (Share milking involves a situation in which the 
herd and the farm have different owners.)  One issue that may be important for assessing 
biopharming in practice, then, is whether the farmer/manager of the herd is also its 
owner.  
 
The type of owner may also be relevant: e.g., an individual or family, a cooperative, or a 
large corporation.  In terms of assessing benefits to New Zealand, it may also be relevant 
whether the operation is New Zealand- or overseas-owned. 
 
                                                 
20 Noelle Muggli-Cockett of Extension and Agriculture at Utah State University suggests that “transgenic 
animals that produce pharmaceutical proteins can be managed by small producers and provide a new 
revenue stream” (PEW, 2005: 7).   
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4.1.5.2.  Who owns the land? 
 
A related issue is whether the owner of the herd also owns the land on which it is farmed. 
Various ownership types and combinations will produce different distributions of profit 
(relevant to assessing benefits) and of responsibility or accountability for management of 
the farm and of the herd (relevant to assessing and managing risk).  The land on which 
the animals are farmed could also be owned in different ways – by a corporate, by a 
group, or by an individual.  The owners involved may or may not be farmers, in the sense 
of being responsible for the day-to-day running of the farm. 
  
4.1.5.3.  Summary of ownership/management possibilities 
 
• Farm manager, corporate ownership – farm and animals are owned by a corporate 
entity which employs a manager to manage the everyday running of the farm. 
• Farmer owns and manages the farm and the animals, producing on contract to a 
biotechnology or pharmaceutical company. 
• Farmer owns the operation but is subsidised for containment and safety costs - to 
be accessible to farmers, containment and management costs could be subsidised 
by a larger company.21  
• A coalition of farmers within a geographical area owns and manages the 
operation, producing on contract to biotechnology or pharmaceutical corporation. 
• A self-contained commercial research enterprise produces the transgenic animals, 
farms them, and produces the product (the GTC Biotherapeutics model).    
 
With the exception of the last option, the assumption here is that purification would be 
carried out off-farm, by a separate enterprise.  The possibility that purification may be 
carried out on-farm introduces yet another variable. 
 
4.1.6.  Four scenarios 
The following four combinations of ownership and operational variables appear to be the 
most likely scenarios under which commercial biopharming would be carried out in New 
Zealand.   All farms would have to meet requirements for containment and audit 
(discussed below).  These scenarios will be examined in the next chapter for their 
practicability in the light of our interviews with farmers. 
 
Scenario 1: Farmer-owned and –operated mixed farm  
 
This scenario would follow the more traditional New Zealand model in which the farmer 
owns both the animals and the land and is also the primary farm operator, perhaps with 
the help of the farmer’s family and/or one or more farm labourers.  The farm would 
include both a small transgenic biopharm herd and a conventional dairy herd.  The 
transgenic animals would be sourced from a specialised transgenic animal production 
operation with a licence to produce certain transgenic animals.  The conventional animals 
                                                 
21 One of the dairy companies whose personnel we interviewed indemnifies their farmers for taking on the 
risk of a new product, so that they are not disadvantaged in relation to other farmers.   
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would be sourced in the usual way, through the farmer’s own breeding of replacements or 
from sales.  The conventional milk would go to the local cooperative dairy factory and 
the pharmaceutical milk to the processing facilities of a private pharmaceutical company.   
 
Scenario 2: Farmer-owned and -operated specialist biopharm 
 
In this scenario a farmer would own the land and the animals and would be responsible 
for the whole farming operation.  The farm would have only biopharm animals and would 
buy its replacement animals from a specialised transgenic animal production operation.  
The milk would be sold to a private pharmaceutical company for processing. 
 
Scenario 3: Corporate-owned, employee-managed biopharm 
 
In this scenario a corporate would own the land and the animals and would employ a 
manager responsible for the whole farming operation.  The farm would have only 
biopharm animals and would buy its replacement animals from a specialised biopharm 
animal production operation.  The transgenic milk would be sold to a private 
pharmaceutical company. 
 
Scenario 4:  Self-contained integrated biopharm 
 
This scenario reflects the organisation of GTC Biotherapeutics.  This farm would produce 
its own animals in its research facility, farm them to produce transgenic milk, and process 
the milk to extract the compound.  The compound could then be sold to a pharmaceutical 
company or, if the biopharm owner is a pharmaceutical company, be developed and 
marketed by the same company. 
 
4.2.  Controls 
 
A commercial biopharming operation in New Zealand would require ERMA approval.  
“Conditional release” was added to the categories of possible ERMA approvals in 2003 
(New Zealand. Environmental Risk Management Authority, November 2003). 
Previously applicants could apply only for containment, field test or full commercial 
release. Full commercial release means that the product requires no controlling or 
monitoring. Conditional release allows a new organism to enter the environment under 
certain specified management and/or monitoring conditions. We assume here that any 
application to ERMA for a commercial biopharming operation would be made under the 
conditional release category. 
 
It is useful to postulate what the ERMA conditions (controls) are likely to be when 
developing biopharming scenarios. The controls may affect who can own a biopharm 
operation, for example, as compliance with controls may be impractical in some 
circumstances or may raise establishment and running costs significantly. Controls may 
also have an impact on the type of farming operation that can be implemented—for 
example, whether biopharming can be combined with conventional farming. Finally, 
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postulating the ERMA conditions makes it possible to identify holders of knowledge that 
may be relevant to assessing the practicality, risks and likely effects of the conditions. 
 
ERMA has not yet approved any applications for commercial biopharming; however, 
they have approved several field tests.  These approvals have come with conditions 
placed on the operations.  The primary purpose of these conditions is to ensure 
containment of the animals and their products. We draw on the documentation of 
conditions imposed on field tests to outline the containment requirements that are likely 
to be imposed on any biopharm operation in New Zealand.  In particular, we assume that 
ERMA would impose conditions similar to those required by its approvals of  
AgResearch’s applications GMF98009 and GMD02028.  (The latter is technically a 
“development” rather than a “field test” application; however, in terms of its proposed 
outdoor activity it appears to differ little from the field test application GMF98009. 22) 
 
4.2.1.  Physical containment of biopharm animals and their products 
 
4.2.1.1. Containment of animals 
 
The most obvious form of containment is the physical containment of the biopharm 
animals themselves.  ERMA has required with regard to existing biopharm research 
facilities that the outdoor containment facility be enclosed by a two-metre-high double 
perimeter fence with an inner fence electronically monitored and alarmed to enable 
location of any breach of containment.  The fence should be constructed in accordance 
with MAF’s Containment Standard for Field Testing of Farm Animals, which prescribes 
the materials to be used and the method of construction. It also mandates that the area 
between the two fences shall be clear, “so that if animals gain access they can be easily 
seen”. 
 
In the event containment is breached, ERMA has required that the operator recover the 
escaped cattle.  If there has been any possibility of mating during the escape, affected 
cows must be destroyed or any pregnancies that may have resulted from the escape 
aborted.  Presumably this applies to neighbouring conventional cows (in case of an 
escaping bull) as well as to any escaping biopharm cows. The MAF inspector responsible 
for the facility must be notified within 24 hours. 
 
The ERMA approvals require that no genetically modified cattle, surrogate mothers 
(cows carrying GM foetuses to full term or near to full term), or recipient cows (cows that 
receive a GM embryo but subsequently lose the foetus) be permitted to leave the outdoor 
containment facility except in accordance with the Containment Standard for Field 
Testing of Farm Animals.  Permission for this must be sought from the facility’s MAF 
inspector, and any transport of animals must be in a sealable, towable conveyance, which 
                                                 
22 Some of the controls imposed by ERMA on GMD02028 were intended to ensure that the distinction 
between “development” and “field trial” was maintained.  For example: “Breeding shall be limited to the 
minimum necessary to complete development. No breeding of animals is allowed, except where necessary 
to ensure that 'true to type' animals have been produced and to investigate stability of inheritance.”   
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must be sealed by the inspector before transfer.  The conveyance, including effluent 
tanks, must be cleaned after unloading.  Further, the animals are to be transported directly 
to the receiving facility and: 
 
[t]he driver shall be given contact phone numbers in the case of an emergency. A 
sign shall be displayed in the cab which states: "In the event of an accident or 
emergency phone these contact phone numbers as soon as possible." These 
numbers shall be readily available in the cab. 
 
It seems likely that, in order to facilitate containment, limitations would be imposed on 
the number of animals allowed on any particular farm.  It is unclear whether transgenic 
bulls would be needed or permitted on the farm.  It is quite possible that the commercial 
biopharm operation would not produce its own replacement animals (see Scenarios 1-3 
above); if it did, presumably frozen semen from founder bulls could be used through 
artificial insemination.  It may be considered that transgenic bulls would pose the greatest 
escape risks; given that other less risky methods of replacement are available, controls 
may involve the exclusion of transgenic bulls.  
 
4.2.1.2.  Identification of animals and facility 
 
In order to facilitate recapture of escaped animals and to prevent inadvertent 
contamination of the conventional milk supply through mishandling, there must be robust 
identification methods for biopharm animals.  ERMA currently requires that: all 
conventional cattle within the facility be double tagged; all genetically modified cattle be 
individually identified by an ear tag and also implanted with a subcutaneous electronic 
microchip for individual electronic identification; and in the event that subcutaneous 
microchips cannot be implanted until cattle reach a certain age, cattle without microchips 
shall have two different types of ear tags in place at all times to allow for immediate 
identification.  The GMF98009 approval requires that the identification system include a 
database from which information on individual genotype and generation can be derived, 
and both approvals require that a register be maintained with records of identity and fate 
of all cattle in the operation. 
 
The Containment Standard also requires that the facility itself be clearly identified: “A 
prominent sign shall be displayed at the entrance(s) to indicate that the premises is [sic] a 
containment facility and that unauthorized entry is prohibited.” 
 
4.2.1.3.  Disposal of carcasses 
ERMA has mandated the method of carcass disposal in all biopharm approvals.  In the 
case of the PPL sheep, this was to be through on-site or off-site incineration.  In the case 
of the cattle research in GMF98009 and GMD02028, it has mandated burial: 
Disposal shall be by burial in unlined offal pits. Offal pits are to be located within the 
outdoor containment facility and shall be positioned to minimise leaching to 
groundwater.  The applicant shall consult with Ngāti Wairere with respect to 
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developing culturally appropriate mechanisms and protocols for disposal, which add 
to and are consistent with the rest of this control. (ERMA 2002) 
It has also mandated that “in the event of mortality in genetically modified cattle in the 
containment facility, carcasses shall be immediately removed to prevent access by 
scavengers.” 
 
In the relevant GMF98009 decision, conventional cows that failed to become pregnant 
after embryo implantation were permitted to be sold or disposed of off-site 50 days after 
three negative pregnancy tests administered 28, 35 and 50 days after embryo transfer. 
Conventional surrogate cows that have given birth to a transgenic calf were also allowed 
to be disposed of off-site after a withholding period of at least 100 days to ensure that no 
foetal blood cells remained (ERMA, 2001: 13, 42).  In decision GMD02028, however, it 
was decided that it was not appropriate to distinguish between recipient cows 
(conventional cattle that have failed to carry a transgenic embryo to term) and surrogate 
mothers (conventional cattle that have given birth to transgenic calves) for the purposes 
of disposal – both of these, as well as offspring that are non-transgenic, should be 
disposed of on-site, through burial in the manner described above (ERMA, 2002: 18-19).     
 
4.2.1.4.  Containment of  milk 
 
ERMA currently requires that milking take place within the containment facility and that 
milk be transported in secure containers to a processing facility registered as meeting the 
requirements of the MAF Biosecurity Authority/ERMA New Zealand Standard 
Containment Facilities for Microorganisms.  In addition to containment requirements, a 
facility for extraction of pharmaceutical substances would be likely to operate under 
additional requirements for assuring the safety of the product.   
 
ERMA also currently requires that the quantity of milk produced and its fate be logged in 
a register.  Any surplus milk and milk components would presumably be subject to the 
same prescriptions for disposal that currently apply to all of the milk produced in the 
approved research, namely: destroyed on site, by an effluent treatment digester, 
incineration, or spraying onto pasture following treatment to destroy any cells present. 
 
It may also happen that different proteins are produced on the same farm.  In this 
situation cows would need to be managed as separate herds and their milk segregated.  
This would add on-farm segregation and containment issues even for an exclusively 
biopharm operation, in the interests of protecting the integrity of the product.  
 
4.2.1.5.  Protection of the food chain 
ERMA currently requires of approved biopharm research operations that they ensure that 
no part or product of any animal involved in the operation—including inter alia surrogate 
mothers, recipient cows and non-transgenic calves—enter the food chain or “be ingested 
by any person at any time”. 
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4.2.2.  Containment of genetic material 
In its most recent decision, ERMA required monitoring of soil organisms for horizontal 
gene transfer (HGT; see above, section 3.2.3):  
Micro-organisms shall be tested for the presence of the introduced genetic 
modifications at the disposal sites. If HGT is detected, genetic modification and 
disposal of cattle shall be immediately halted and the Chief Executive of ERMA 
New Zealand informed. A remediation plan to manage the impact of the HGT 
event shall be developed in consultation with the Chief Executive of ERMA New 
Zealand. (ERMA, 2002) 
If HGT is recognised as a hazard, it is likely that monitoring of micro-organisms will be 
required at disposal sites, but also potentially farm-wide in consideration of HGT 
occurring through animal waste.  More extensive controls may also be put in place to 
prevent the spread of soil or animal waste off-farm, such as cleaning protocols or 
restrictions on movement on and off the farm.   This may be particularly likely in the case 
of biopharming for compounds with antimicrobial properties.  
Given the vision noted earlier (see section 3.2.3) of biopharming as a method to produce 
new antibiotics to overcome the problem of antibiotic resistance, and given that many 
therapeutic substances have inadvertent antimicrobial properties, this may become a 
significant regulatory issue impacting upon a range of biopharm farming practices, 
particularly with regard to the disposal of waste and carcasses.  However, in light of the 
many opportunities for HGT presented by outdoor grazing (not only contact with soil and 
water, but also, e.g., blood-sucking insects), management of this hazard may be found to 
require that animals be kept in indoor facilities. 
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Chapter 5: Relevant Practices  
This chapter considers the potential benefits and hazards posed by biopharming in the 
context of current practices in the dairy-farming sector.  It will highlight what has been 
learned from interviews with farmers about practices in the dairy sector that may have a 
bearing on the scenarios outlined in the previous chapter and, in particular, on the 
implementation of protocols developed to manage potential hazards.  
 
Interviews were conducted by phone or in person with dairy farmers from Canterbury, 
Taranaki and Waikato and with goat farmers supplying to the New Zealand Dairy Goat 
Co-operative.   The farmers were selected through a search of dairying websites such as 
those of Federated Farmers, Dairy Insight and the New Zealand Dairy Goat Co-operative, 
which had contact details of some farmers.  Personal networks of farmers who could 
suggest potential interviewees were also used, as were suggestions by the farmers already 
interviewed.  We intentionally included farmers with experiences of farming in different 
areas in New Zealand and also included an organic practitioner.  These interviews 
focused on current practices on dairy farms and how they might impact upon or be 
impacted by a conversion to animal biopharming.23
 
Farmers were interviewed about current farm practices as well as the challenges farmers 
face when trying to meet existing (i.e., non-biopharm) quality controls.  These 
discussions highlighted a number of everyday practices in dairy farming that acquire 
special significance in relation to biopharming. In this analysis, we group these practices 
into two categories: social influences on rule-following and practical implications for 
containment. 
 
We note that at least some of the risks and implications identified in these interviews are 
avoidable through careful planning and considerable spending. However, if they are to be 
managed, they first must be identified. 
 
 
5.1.  Biopharming on the dairy farm: social influences on rule-following 
 
The literature on local knowledge and risk assessment is littered with examples of 
individuals not following rules and behaving in unexpected ways (at least unexpected to 
those looking from the outside), generally making risk management more complex than it 
may initially seem. Rules and controls are often demonstrated to be unrealistic, 
impractical or irrelevant in the contexts of application in practice. The inability of 
authorities to contain Starlink corn (Marvier & Acker, 2005) or the BSE outbreak in the 
UK, among others,24 point to the need to understand rule-following from within the 
                                                 
23 This material is occasionally supplemented with insights from the annual reports made by the operators 
of the AgResearch Containment farm to ERMA as a part of their audit requirements. 
24 Irwin’s (1995) account of the dispute between farm workers and the UK Advisory Committee on 
Pesticides (ACP) over the use of the herbicide 2,4,5-T is particularly relevant here.  The ACP concluded 
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social dynamics of the rule-following context. Complex contexts may favour adaptable 
practitioners; an appreciation of adaptability may engender resistance to fixed standards 
and rules (Wynne, 1988).25
 
In our interviews, farmers noted that relying on the prescription of biopharm farming 
practices (i.e., controls) to avoid harms may be risky.  Many of the farmers interviewed 
suggested that the effectiveness of controls will depend in part on how farmers interpret 
them and how they feel about them. Given that animal biopharming is likely to be, at 
least initially, subject to strong controls,26 the interviews illustrate the importance of 
looking at farmers’ rule-following practices when seeking to gauge risks. 
 
The following section presents the factors, identified through the interviews, that are 
likely to influence the degree to which biopharming rules are followed.  
 
5.1.1.  Ownership  
Most interviewees felt that farmers are likely to be more meticulous with and committed 
to animals that they own.  In their view, ownership of animals was associated with a 
higher level not only of care for the animal but also of attention to rules around managing 
the animals.  Several interviewees regarded the scenario in which a farm-manager would 
run the farm (see scenario 3) as potentially risky for this reason.  However, whilst the 
majority of farmers interviewed agreed that ownership will affect attitude and in turn may 
affect willingness to follow rules, one farmer believed farm managers would be 
particularly capable of performing the proper procedures, because of the training and 
experience they must acquire before being employed as managers. 
                                                                                                                                                 
that the pesticide was safe, provided it was used “in the recommended way”. Farmworkers, with knowledge 
of actual farm practices as well as of the social (power) relations involved, argued that it could not be 
judged safe because the prescribed precautions could not in fact be taken in the actually existing contexts of 
use: “the conditions envisaged by members of the [ACP] ….are impossible to reproduce in the field” (17-
18).  In the case of Starlink, faulty assumptions about the planting practices of farmers assumed that the 
segregation rules for GM corn would be easily followed, which thus provided a false confidence in 
containability (Taylor & Tick, 2000). The BSE example relates to scientific recommendations made to 
ensure safety of cows that ignored the social realities of meat-industry practices in Britain.  
25 Rosin et al. (2007a; 2007b) found that, despite the importance of compliance with the EurepGAP 
programme to the kiwifruit industry’s marketing strategy in Europe and the high cost of discovery of non-
compliance, many kiwifruit producers strongly resented the volume and detail of the paperwork involved in 
the EurepGAP audit; they did not view compliance as either integral or appropriate to the broader skills of 
being a good kiwifruit producer, rejecting paperwork and audit requirements perceived to be either 
repetitive of existing requirements or excessive in regard to the detail of audited practice. (This was not the 
case, however, among a minority of younger producers.)  In a parallel study of the sheep/beef production 
sector in New Zealand, Rosin et al (2007c) documented an even greater reluctance among sheep farmers to 
apply assurance scheme protocols, despite often perceiving the potential value of the audited practices.  The 
farmers resented the office-based requirements (i.e., paperwork) which contributed to a range of 
‘compliance costs’ that they saw as being responsible for poor economic performance by the sector.  These 
findings are consistent with the findings from our interviews with the dairy sector. 
26 As stated earlier, this may depend on the classification of the health product the animal is designed to 
produce. For example, as Pharma (NV) is seeking to classify human lactoferrin as GRAS (Generally 
Recognised as Safe) through the FDA (Food and Drug Administration, U.S), this may have implications for 
the level of controls required for that particular product in New Zealand (Cow-produced Lactoferrin 
Completes GRAS notification, 2006).  
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5.1.2.  Farmers’ perception of risk 
The farmers’ own beliefs regarding the riskiness of an operation may affect the likelihood 
that they will accurately follow controls.  That is, if a control is felt to be arbitrary or out 
of proportion to the risk as the farmer understands it, it may not be followed. This implies 
that the effectiveness of controls is to a significant degree reliant on farmer discretion.  
 
One interviewee gave as an illustration the example of effluent disposal:  
 
They think ‘oh, this will do’. You know, ‘The rules are that strict, but if we do this 
and this, it might be all right’. 
 
With reference to biopharming, a farmer indicated that prescribed procedures in relation 
to escapes of biopharm animals from containment may not be followed. The farmer 
admitted that he would be unlikely to report any escape of biopharm cows onto his farm 
because he would not want to deal with red tape and potential monitoring requirements 
for an eventuality he did not believe was a risk. Thus, in the case of an animal escaping 
onto his farm, he would be likely to return it (or not) without reporting the case, even if 
this was required to be done by regulation. The requirement to destroy potentially 
affected animals or terminate pregnancies may reinforce this tendency.   
 
These comments suggest that the effectiveness of containment protocols may depend not 
only on the biopharming farmer, but on his/her neighbours as well.  In this example, 
protocols around managing escapes may be undermined by a reluctance of neighbouring 
farmers to comply.  
 
Similar issues were identified in a farmer’s discussion of “slackness” around the 
management of herds containing tuberculosis-infected cows.  There are geographical 
areas where animal movement is restricted and animals must be traceable, but, it was 
indicated, farmers may just move them without telling anyone.  One farmer said it was 
only a small proportion of farmers who behave like this, but it does happen.  It was also 
noted that ear tags can and do fall out - and may even be helped to do so.  This suggests, 
among other things, that a more permanent and tamper-proof method of identification of 
biopharm cows may be necessary to maintain segregation and containment. 
 
A number of farmers were also found to be resistant to the idea of clearly identifying any 
biopharm operation through prominent signage.  This was due partly to a different 
evaluation of the nature and degree of risk and partly to disagreement regarding the 
strategy for the management of risk.  Some felt that signage may attract protesters or 
otherwise bring unwanted attention. 
 
5.1.3.  Economic incentives to flout rules 
One farmer suggested that rules are most often ignored when there is an economic 
incentive not to follow them.  In particular, shortcuts may be taken when income is down.  
For example, if a farmer owns the operation and is responsible for paying to ensure that 
all controls are met, compliance with controls may be particularly influenced by 
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economic factors.  As with any product, increased market supply or reduced market 
demand may erode the profitability of the operation.  In the case of biopharming, the 
existence of potentially competing production platforms could bring about sudden 
increases in supply (and reductions in price), while the complexities involved in the 
production of biopharm animals may make it difficult to respond to price changes by 
changing production to a different biopharmed substance. Such pressures experienced by 
a farmer directly or through his/her employer could provide an incentive not to follow the 
rules. 
 
5.1.4.  Employment issues and human error 
Quality of employees, the number of workers employed and high staff turnover rates 
were all identified as risk areas for animal biopharming.  A 2002 report showed that 76% 
of employees in the dairy farm industry had worked within the industry for over a year.  
However, only 28% had been in their present job for more than one season (Shearle, 
2002: 17).  This indicates a high level of job turnover that will have to be addressed by 
farmers, or pharmaceutical companies, who hire farm managers and farm workers.  
Training will be a high priority in order to ensure the safety of animal biopharming, but 
the high level of turnover may make this more difficult and costly.  An implication for 
farmers is that they may have to commit to longer-term employment under an animal 
biopharming operation.  One interviewee suggested it would be particularly impractical 
for share milkers to be involved in animal biopharming because they tend to move farms 
every three or four years. 
 
Most interviewees could relate a litany of human error that occurs in everyday farming 
practice.  With regard to animal biopharming, the issue of human error may become more 
important in relation both to safety and to the economic impact of current liability laws, 
which decree that liability falls on those who break rules.  Thus, securing quality labour 
was considered by the farmers we interviewed to be vital to the safety and economic 
success of animal biopharming.  
 
Interviewees cited the example of cows being milked that were not meant to be, simply 
through lack of communication or concentration.  The milk of cows being treated with 
antibiotics, for example, is meant to be kept out of the milk sold off the farm, and these 
cows are marked to indicate this. However, our interviewees cited cases of such markings 
coming off or just being missed by the person responsible for milking. These errors occur 
despite the fact that Fonterra and other dairy companies impose heavy financial penalties 
for farmers whose milk contains antibiotics.  In fact, the potential for human error in 
milking cows was considered important enough for all farmers to suggest that biopharm 
cows be kept entirely separated from non-biopharm cows, or at the very least in different 
milking chambers.  
 
One of the farmers we interviewed interview suggested that errors are particularly prone 
to happen on farms with many employees.  Changes in shift times and more people on 
the farm mean that communication becomes difficult and mistakes are made. Another of 
our interviewees noted the tendency for employees’ drinking on certain nights to affect 
the next day’s attentiveness to the job. 
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Compliance and auditor reports from the AgResearch containment farm also point to the 
ubiquity of human error.  For example, the auditor’s reports show that some milk was 
sent to a destination that had not requested it, the number of embryos imported and used 
were not correctly recorded, and semen sent off site for processing into straws was not 
traced correctly.  In addition, the staff training file had not been correctly updated and a 
new staff member had not been trained correctly about the keeping of lab records (Hale, 
2006: 46, 56; Operator, 2005: 33).  As these examples and the improper disposal of 
genetically engineered pigs at the University of Illinois-Urbana/Champaign (FDA, 2003) 
illustrate, even in a controlled situation such as a contained research unit with qualified 
staff, mistakes are made.  Many more opportunities for human error will be present on a 
full-scale commercial farm. 
 
 
5.2.  Biopharming on the dairy farm: Practical implications for farming 
practices 
 
Previous chapters have explained the need to contain bioreactor animals, their products 
and the transgenes they incorporate.  The interviewees identified several areas of practice 
that may affect the ability to contain animals and soil within an animal biopharming 
operation. Significant changes to farming practice may have to occur to ensure that safety 
is maintained on the biopharm.  
 
5.2.1.  Size of herd 
Typical milking facilities are designed to milk hundreds of cows; they cannot, according 
to the interviewees, be used on small herds, as the quantity of milk obtained from them 
would not be enough even to push through the milking machinery.  This implies that 
milking small biopharm herds would require the design and installation of new milking 
facilities, which also incorporate even stricter cleanliness standards, significantly raising 
the cost of the operation.  The interviewees also suggested that the transportation of 
significantly smaller amounts of milk will result in additional costs and infrastructure 
requirements, such as smaller tankers that pick up smaller quantities of milk more 
frequently. 
  
One interviewee also suggested that new technology may allow some processing to be 
carried out on-farm. This could reduce the volume of the product leaving the farm.  
Another possibility is on-farm freezing of the milk or semi-processed product, so that it 
can be sent for purification in larger batches as required.  This processing could take 
place on or off the farm.  On-farm processing may in turn limit the impact of transport 
issues; however, it would raise other investment, containment and hygiene issues.  
 
5.2.2.  Grazing patterns 
The common practice of off-farm grazing, particularly prevalent in the winter (in some 
areas of the country), is used to save pasture on the farm for the spring, which is the 
period of highest demand.  This may have practical implications for the controllability 
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and containment of animal biopharming operations in the future.  Depending on the size 
of the operation, it may be impractical to keep the cows on the same unit all year round.    
If the farmers were to graze biopharm animals off the farm in the winter, then additional 
safeguards may need to be implemented during transport of cows and measures may need 
to be in place to monitor the spread of heritable material to soil microorganisms and 
possibly to other animals on those paddocks.  At the very least, this illustrates that strictly 
containing animals to one specific area may be a more complex task than it appears, 
requiring changes to normal farming practices. 
 
The issue of DDT residues in the soil of some farmland in New Zealand was also raised.    
DDT is insecticide which was widely used from the 1950s until it was found to 
accumulate in the environment and in organisms within the food chain.  Although the 
levels of DDE, the DDT residue, found in New Zealand soil are expected to be below the 
level that would cause health problems, the risk and undesirability of the chemical 
entering the food chain and further accumulation in New Zealand soils was enough to ban 
its use in 1970 (Hunt, 2004a; Boul, 1994: 257).  Winter feed frequently is in the form of 
root crops or other forage apart from grass, and cows may ingest a percentage of the dirt 
containing the DDE, which is retained in the animal’s fat.  During the spring when the 
cow comes into milk, the first milkings may contain DDE.  From this process it is 
possible that DDE can enter the milk supply   This means that some farmers graze their 
cows on low DDE properties during the winter. 
  
It will be important for controls to be in place to ensure that farms have low enough 
levels of DDT to ensure that off-farm grazing is not required. Currently, testing is done 
on farms before they are converted to dairying; however, the levels may need to be lower 
in the case of animal biopharming operations.  Alternatively, biopharm operations would 
need a low enough stocking rate to avoid off-farm grazing.  
 
5.2.3.  Disposal of animals 
As already noted, the number of animals needed by an animal biopharming operation will 
vary according to which pharmaceutical substance is produced and its concentration in 
the milk.  It is consistently predicted, however, that relatively small herds will produce 
enough to satisfy many biopharmaceutical markets.  As pregnancy is necessary to induce 
lactation, culling will be a significant part of herd management.   
 
Animals regularly destroyed in AgResearch’s biopharm field test include transgenic bulls 
(once adequate stores of semen have been collected; this is required by ERMA), cows 
that do not express sufficient concentrations of the desired protein, and non-transgenic 
calves produced in order to initiate lactation.  The last category may be particularly 
relevant to commercial biopharm operations.  ERMA requires that these animals be 
buried on-site and prohibits their sale into the human food or pet food supply (ERMA, 
2002). 
 
If these rules apply to commercial biopharm operations, they could, according to our 
interviewees, pose economic and environmental problems.  Some farmers and share 
milkers derive a significant amount of their income from the sale of bobby calves and the 
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culling of animals.  This would not be permitted under the rules noted above.  Our 
interviewees also highlighted potential impacts on groundwater of on-farm burial of large 
numbers of carcasses; such impacts would others beyond the biopharm.  
 
5.2.4.  Health of animals/excess milk 
Because it is likely that biopharm milk will need to be kept at a higher standard of 
cleanliness, farmers may need to be more than usually protective of the animals’ health. 
Thus the cost of veterinary care can be expected to be considerably higher.  It may also 
be necessary to hold extra animals in case an animal does get sick, in order to ensure 
continuity of supply. If this is the case, the disposal of excess milk may become a factor.  
Several interviewees suggested that the practice of spraying unused milk onto the 
paddock may have to be changed, particularly if this land is being grazed by non-
transgenic animals as well.  The chance of this milk affecting the soil composition may 
also be an issue.   
 
5.2.5.  Location of the farm 
Our interviews with farmers highlighted several factors to do with the location of the 
biopharm.  Interviewees emphasised the importance of soil characteristics.  In order to 
minimise impact on groundwater systems, soils should be deep and free-draining; in 
order to minimise impact on streams, clay soils, which result in greater run-off, should be 
avoided. 
 
An aspect of location identified by farmers that may affect the containment of animals is 
vulnerability to flooding. An interviewee described the level of disorganisation that 
occurs during a flood, in which normally controlled environments are disrupted, and 
animals from different farms may become mixed together. The ramifications for 
containment are obvious.  For these reasons, the farmers suggested that animal 
biopharming should not be permitted in areas that might flood.   
 
5.2.6.  Traffic on and off the farm 
As noted in Chapter 4, there has been significant debate about the effect animal 
biopharming may have on soil and its micro-organisms. Many farmers suggested that any 
need to contain soil would be complicated by various farming processes that effectively 
require traffic through the farms. The potential for hay bailers and fertilizers to spread 
soil from one farm to another was identified by the interviewees. It is questionable 
whether workers applying fertilizer or hay-bailer operators could be expected to clean 
their equipment thoroughly each time they exit the farm. An editorial in Nature 
Biotechnology questions the wisdom of presuming farmers will follow such meticulous 
cleaning standards in relation to GM plants; the point may also be applicable here (Nature 
Biotechnology, 2002: 527). 
 
5.2.7.  Fate of biopharm properties  
As stated previously, the PPL therapeutics field tests ended with controversy centring on 
monitoring and future use of the property.  Farmers could envision similar problems 
occurring as a result of current patterns of farm-property ownership in New Zealand. The 
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high turnover rate of farms, with farms changing hands relatively rapidly, raises issues 
around post-biopharming use of the land.  The interviews suggest that the same issues 
that arose after the closure of PPL operation, such as the appropriate fate of the biopharm 
animals and the use of the land for grazing conventional animals, will inevitably arise in 
this situation. The question of the limitations on post-biopharm uses of the land may be 
important from a safety perspective and was noted as being important from an economic 
perspective. The ability to revert to normal dairying was questioned by several farmers. 
Not only may land that has once been used for biopharming not be suitable for 
conventional farming again, it may also be difficult for a farmer to get back into a co-
operative such as Fonterra.  The interviews suggested that such obstacles in the way of 
returning to conventional farming would make many farmers reluctant to become 
involved in biopharming.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
This chapter summarises the substantive findings of the research on the types of animal 
biopharming most likely to be pursued in New Zealand over the next 10-15 years and the 
practical issues relevant to assessing potential scenarios for animal biopharming.  It also 
presents some preliminary findings on the substantive and methodological implications 
for assessing and managing the risks of biopharming. (A full report on regulatory and 
governance implications will be produced later in the project.)   
 
6.1.  Types of animal biopharming 
 
If commercial animal biopharming in New Zealand is to capture the value associated 
with research and development, it would appear that it would need to use dairy cows to 
produce biopharmaceutical substances in their milk.  We base this conclusion on current 
research programmes27 and commercial arrangements, as well as on the advantages of 
cows in terms of the volume of milk produced and the existence of dairying expertise and 
infrastructure in New Zealand.  However, this conclusion comes with several caveats.   
 
First, precisely because dairying is becoming ubiquitous in New Zealand, it may be 
difficult to find locations meeting all safety criteria that are also sufficiently distant from 
other dairy herds to mitigate contamination risks.  Second, the size of the dairy industry 
also means that any negative impacts that bovine biopharming may have on the market 
for non-biopharm milk from New Zealand would have a significant negative impact on 
New Zealand’s economy.  Third, should HGT be recognised as a significant risk, either 
in general or in relation to specific compounds, regulations may require animal 
biopharming to be carried out in indoor facilities.  This would negate some of the 
advantages noted above (e.g., existing dairying infrastructure and dairy-farm 
management expertise), and the relatively large size of cows would perhaps become a 
disadvantage.  In this case, attention may turn to goats. 
 
A goat-milk industry exists in New Zealand, and our interviews indicated that 
biopharming has not been absolutely ruled out.  They also pointed to a move toward the 
use of indoor facilities in the industry.  However, interviewees also indicated they would 
be very reluctant to embark on anything that could jeopardise their success in the 
sensitive, higher-value markets they currently supply.  
 
There is little evidence of New Zealand-based interest in using sheep for biopharming at 
this stage, though that does not preclude another PPL-like operation in which an overseas 
company uses a New Zealand farming operation to produce the compounds they market. 
 
                                                 
27 As noted earlier, however, AgResearch has announced its intention to expand its biopharm research to 
include goats and sheep. 
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Biopharming using other animals—such as chickens, pigs, or even rabbits—if proposed 
for New Zealand, would most likely take the form of a contract operation for an overseas 
company.  Given the lack of New Zealand-based research on these animals, research, 
development and (perhaps) purification activities would be likely to be carried out 
outside New Zealand. 
 
 
6.2.  Feasibility of the scenarios  
 
6.2.1.  New Zealand farmers as biopharmers (Scenarios 1 and 2) 
Scenarios 1 and 2 envisioned that some New Zealand dairy farmers would become 
biopharmers. As one of our key actor interviewees argued, existing farming expertise is 
one of New Zealand’s advantages in the animal biopharming arena: 
 
You would be looking to utilise the knowledge that we have in handling 250 cows 
with one man and a dog, which we do on our dairy farms….[Y]ou would want to 
get all the productivity gains that would come from good New Zealand farm 
practice, but also obviously the significant increase in revenue gains from 
producing something other than milk. 
 
Our interviews highlighted a number of obstacles to this. 
 
Farmers did not generally think it would be possible to include both biopharm and 
conventional dairying in the same operation.   In their view, it would be necessary for a 
farm property to be devoted exclusively to biopharming in order to protect the integrity of 
both biopharm and conventional products.  But operating a specialist biopharm would 
raise further challenges for farmers. 
 
Farmers pointed out that an operation involving a small specialist herd producing a 
product requiring high levels of segregation and containment would require a dedicated 
infrastructure: not only dedicated paddocks and special fencing, but also milking and 
transport infrastructures suitable for relatively small quantities of milk and high levels of 
containment.  Constraints on other practices, such as off-farm wintering, imply being able 
to afford a higher land-to-stock ratio and buying in winter feed.  (This would presumably 
be affordable if returns to farmers were to increase to the levels predicted by some of our 
key actors.)    
 
Costs of establishment of a specialist biopharm also include the consequences to the 
farmer of opting out of their supply relationship with Fonterra, or other cooperative—i.e., 
it may be difficult or impossible to opt back into that relationship later.  This would be a 
major risk for a farmer to take.  Similarly, it is likely that a farmer producing biopharm 
milk would supply a single company (which is very unlikely to be a farmers’ 
cooperative).  This raises risks associated with the considerable power differentials likely 
to be present in such a relationship and with the fate of the farmer should the company 
withdraw from the business or go into liquidation.  
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Finally, farmers also expressed a lack of enthusiasm for the kind of contract operation in 
which their activities are highly prescribed.  They saw this as eroding the autonomy of 
the farmer to an unacceptable degree.  
 
6.2.2.  New Zealand farms as biopharms (Scenarios 1, 2 and 3) 
Farmers suggested that there would be fairly extensive topographic and other physical 
criteria that would need to be met by a biopharm property.  In addition to this, there may 
also be difficulties associated with scaling up biopharm activities from their current 
research facilities to multiple commercial operations.  One of these is disposal of waste.  
Currently, ERMA controls require that carcasses and surplus milk be disposed of on-site, 
carcasses through burial and milk through spraying on pasture.  Farmers expressed 
concerns about the impacts of carcass burial on groundwater and thus on neighbouring 
properties. Such issues related to disposal of carcasses and surplus milk would 
presumably become more significant in the event that biopharming moves beyond a 
single research site and into commercial production.  
 
A major uncertainty affecting the feasibility of New Zealand farms as biopharms is the 
impact of horizontal gene transfer (HGT; see section 3.2.3).   First, were HGT to be 
recognised as a significant risk of biopharming (in general or in relation to particular 
compounds), containment would become much more complex, to the point where it 
would likely require indoor facilities.  This would add very significantly to the costs of 
the operation.  One of the key actors we interviewed suggested that hygiene and purity 
demands for pharmaceuticals would require indoor production in any case, and that this 
would seriously undermine the economic feasibility of animal biopharming in New 
Zealand.  A second major impact would be the limitations that would need to be placed 
on future uses of the land.  The lack of flexibility in land use or sale implied by this was a 
major concern to our interviewees; few would be interested in embarking on an operation 
from which it would be practically impossible to opt out. 
 
Even if certain types of animal biopharming are found by New Zealand regulators to be 
safe, and hence requiring minimal controls, overseas markets may force strict procedural 
standards regardless. This could mean, for example, that non-biopharm dairy farmers in 
New Zealand are required to perform additional procedures or tests in order to ensure 
access to key export markets. 
 
6.2.3.  Biopharm factories in New Zealand (Scenario 4) 
From a number of perspectives, including hygiene and animal-health requirements of 
pharmaceutical regulators as well as issues raised by horizontal gene transfer, it could be 
argued that Scenario 4 (the self-contained, integrated biopharm) may be the most 
plausible.  In this scenario, the operation produces its own animals in its research facility, 
farms them to produce transgenic milk, and processes the milk to extract the compound. 
This raises a number of questions regarding biopharming’s benefits to New Zealand. 
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First, if it were to be seen as necessary to keep the biopharm animals indoors all or most 
of the time (as is the case with GTC Biotherapeutics’ goats), this would appear to erode 
the potential cost-effectiveness of biopharming, particularly if using cows. 
 
Second, there is the question of who could carry out such an operation.  The most likely 
New Zealand candidate currently would be AgResearch or an AgResearch spin-off 
company.  However, our interviewees at AgResearch were insistent that the point of 
developing the technology was for it to go out to New Zealand farmers.  The array of 
highly technical skills and access to intellectual property needed to run this kind of self-
contained operation, however, would appear to rule that out.   It may be possible for 
Fonterra to embark on such an operation; however, our interviews suggested that 
Fonterra’s own explorations of biopharming’s potential had not produced a convincing 
economic case for this. 
 
Third, if this model were to require investment and management by an overseas 
pharmaceutical or biotechnology company, there is reason to question whether it would 
happen in New Zealand at all.  New Zealand’s disease-free status could effectively be 
exported through the export of founder animals.  Examples exist already of the use of 
stock sourced in New Zealand for this reason: Dolly, the first cloned sheep, was produced 
from a New Zealand sheep, and GTC’s biopharm goat herd was produced from goats 
imported from New Zealand.  This raises the question of why an overseas company 
would establish an operation of this kind in New Zealand when New Zealand-sourced 
“safe” animals can be used anywhere in the world.   
 
Fourth, the amount of economic benefit that New Zealand would derive from a self-
contained, overseas-owned biopharm operation would have to be weighed again the risks 
it may pose for New Zealand’s primary-production exports (see Kaye-Blake et al., 2007). 
 
 
6.3.  Some preliminary findings of implications for risk assessment and 
risk management  
 
Our interviews pointed to a number of factors that may not, under current approaches, be 
considered in risk assessment processes: the effects of ownership and personal 
assessments of risk on rule-following; the availability of competent staff and the ubiquity 
of human error; and the impact of economic incentives to flout rules. 
  
6.3.1.  Will controls be implemented? 
Our interviews strongly suggest that it is relevant when assessing the risks of a proposed 
activity to consider whether it is practical to assume that mandated controls will be 
consistently implemented.  Interviews with those with detailed knowledge of the relevant 
social contexts suggest that ownership arrangements as well as operators’ and employees’ 
personal assessments of and attitudes toward the risks involved may have a direct bearing 
on whether rules to minimise risks are followed.  
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6.3.2.  Human error and expecting the unexpected  
Most of the farmers assumed that human error is inevitable.  They generally accepted that 
the natural environment and human behaviour cannot be completely controlled. From the 
interviewees’ perspective it is not controversial to state that unexpected events and 
behaviour occur.  Risk assessment should also work from this assumption.  
 
A similar point is made by Marvier and Acker who list several examples of human error 
in the containment of corn to suggest that risk assessment should include the inevitability 
of human error (Marvier and Acker, 2005: 101).  If, as they suggest, “smart, highly 
trained, and conscientious people make mistakes, and those mistakes may be repeated 
and go unnoticed for years” (Marvier and Acker 2005, p.102), it would seem advisable 
for risk assessors to consider systematically the implications of human error.  
 
It may therefore be relevant to take into account the likelihood of an operation hiring 
well-qualified staff.  In a tight labour market, farmers or biopharm companies may not be 
able to find staff that can be relied upon to understand and implement detailed controls.  
There may be little incentive for staff to gain skills particular to a biopharming operation 
that will not be saleable elsewhere. In a situation of staff shortages there may also just be 
too much work to do in a given time, making “short cuts” more likely.  Alternatively, 
operators may be reluctant to pay the added costs of well-qualified labour in a “sellers’ 
market”.   All of this suggests that risk assessment and management may require a more 
detailed understanding of labour needs and supply and/or more intensive monitoring of 
operations.  
 
6.3.3.  Taking account of economic influences in risk assessment  
The findings regarding economic influences on farmer behaviour may have implications 
for how risk is assessed. Instead of treating the economic dimensions of a proposed 
activity or organism as a separate issue, quantifiable in terms of economic cost and 
benefit, it may be pertinent to view economic issues as integral to environmental and 
health risks. The farmers’ comments illustrate that economic factors may influence 
behaviour relevant to such risks, such as the ability or willingness to follow safety 
prescriptions.    
 
6.3.4.  Legal protections and expectations of those potentially at risk 
Finally, we note that interviewees expected that the Resource Management Act (RMA) 
would protect them from any potential negative impacts of a neighbouring biopharm. 
 
We are covered by the RMA anyway.  Because [with the RMA], I wouldn’t be 
allowed downstream effects, it shouldn’t have [an] effect on me.  The Resource 
Management Act will protect you there, because there has got to be tolerable land 
use.   
 
However, the degree to which residents are protected by the RMA is unclear, as is the 
ability of local government to use the RMA to ensure stricter standards of containment 
than ERMA has imposed.  While the courts have ruled the precautionary principle to be 
 61
Constructive Conversations/Kōrero Whakaaetanga Rpt 12 
 
inherent in the RMA, ERMA’s use of the precautionary principle is optional (Terry, 
2004: 17).  Terry suggests that the government has not yet explored the implications of 
these conflicting standards of precaution (ibid.: v).  
 
The potential for conflict between local government and ERMA rulings is also discussed 
by the Ministry for the Environment (MfE), which suggests that whilst it is possible for 
local governments to use the RMA to control the use of genetic modification (which 
would include biopharming) in their region, this would be very difficult to do.  The 
Ministry’s website states that the issues surrounding GM safety are “highly technical, 
meaning that councils are unlikely to have the skills to deal with these issues” (MfE, 
n.d.). As ERMA is a specialised body designated to perform risk analysis, MfE suggests 
it will be difficult for local governments to offer any legitimate reasons for GM not to 
proceed if approved by ERMA.  
 
In our view, the findings from our interviews challenge this assumption. The interviews 
have shown that people who are unlikely to participate in ERMA’s risk-assessment 
processes may have detailed knowledge of how animal biopharming could affect their 
particular local environment. Two conclusions may be drawn from this.  One is that local 
authorities may, in some cases, have better access to this knowledge of the land and 
social practices within a region than would ERMA.  Another is that processes for eliciting 
and utilising this knowledge would be a valuable addition to ERMA’s repertoire.  
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